SeaLight loves to make the complex understandable, and so has collaborated with the amazing IEJ Media founder <a href="https://twitter.com/ianellisjones">Ian Ellis-Jones</a> to produce this infographic of South China Sea hotspots, current as of April 2024.&nbsp;To be honest, we had the easy end of this deal--Ian did all the hard graphics work and we nit-picked the details. Enjoy!

Pretext (noun): a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of affairs.On 14 February 2024, a Chinese speedboat operating within restricted waters along the coast of Taiwan's Kinmen Island was approached by the Taiwan Coast Guard and directed to submit for inspection. The speedboat fled the scene but then capsized, leading to the deaths of two of its crew. China has since boosted its own coast guard patrols around Kinmen, and further indicated that this increase will be permanent.<figure class="image image-style-side image_resized" style="width:53.47%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/2000x2000_0478018911954_b47db7267f.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1710115061&amp;Signature=riljS8%2BxZaHZMAQ0f%2Btv7enTGqI%3D" alt="2000x2000_0478018911954.jpg"></figure>The Kinmen incident is just the latest example in a well-established pattern by which Beijing exploits incidents and confrontations as a pretext to escalate, while laying the responsibility for its own escalation on the other party.&nbsp;In this case, Beijing immediately announced its intent to tighten its grip around the vulnerable island. <a href="https://theatlasnews.co/latest/2024/02/19/china-responds-to-february-14th-incident-near-kinmen-island/">Its spokesperson immediately labeled</a> the Taiwan Coast Guard's actions as "outrageous" and "inhumane", saying the Chinese crew had been treated in a "rough and dangerous way", and throwing in for good measure that its occurrence during Lunar New Year made it especially egregious.&nbsp;Having laid this pretextual groundwork, she then foreshadowed and prejustified Beijing's escalation, stating that China "reserves the right to take further measures, and all consequences will be borne by the Taiwan side.”The China Coast Guard then proceeded to increase the intensity of its patrols around Kinmen, while Beijing's <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1307667.shtml">English-language propagandists went into high gear</a> to explain that it intends to make this a one-way ratchet up the escalatory scale:&nbsp;<blockquote>The Chinese mainland's maritime law enforcement authorities on Sunday conducted more patrols in waters near Kinmen in a move to safeguard the safety of fishermen's lives and property, after Taiwan authorities brutally assaulted a mainland fishing boat in the region earlier this month which led to the death of two crew members.The combined effect of the fatal incident and continued "Taiwan independence" activities by the secessionist Taiwan authorities will see such patrols become routine, experts said.</blockquote>Note how Beijing's "experts" also took the opportunity to gratuitously add the recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-election-cbf44565b771cddfb60c2a26d2014b0c">victory by the more hawkish Democratic People's Party candidate</a> in Taiwan's presidential elections to its list of pretextual justifications.&nbsp;I recently explained this pretext-to-escalation phenomenon during an appearance on TaiwanPlus News:<div class="raw-html-embed"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/6-B3h-H-nXY?si=ItStyoQ4FFA6D8EQ" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div><blockquote>Q: Is this situation in Kinmen with the increased presence of Chinese coast guard ships ... going to escalate?A: [The situation] is escalating now, but that is pretty typical of how China conducts maritime gray zone operations--is it seeks opportunities to escalate, believing that it has a greater appetite for escalation than its opponent ... [T]his shows us how China uses pretext as a method for advancing its strategic objectives ...Q: As we're seeing more and more Chinese coast guard ships patrol these waters, is this a sign of a new normal?A: Well they've practically announced it, right? [China's English-language newspaper] Global Times just came out with an article that said that we're now going to normalize these activities. And so they've told you already that ... their entire intent is to give you a new normal ... [T]his meets entirely with this pattern that we've seen from China over the years of using the pretext of some event ... by which it then takes that next step and then settles everybody in at that next new normal, so that there can be in the future another new normal.</blockquote>This is only the latest example of the pretext-to-escalate tactic, and it's crucial to understand its pivotal place in <a href="https://www.sealight.live/search?tag=Playbook">China's gray-zone tactics playbook</a>.China's fishing vessels--together with its shadowy <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/pulling-back-curtain-chinas-maritime-militia">maritime militia</a> who claim innocuous "fishing" status--often play a central role in setting the pretext-to-escalation tactic into motion. This was demonstrated as early as its 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands with South Vietnam, in which the first (pretextual) advance was made by Chinese "fishermen", who occupied two South Vietnam-claimed islands and drew Saigon's navy into the skirmish that resulted in its defeat and the islands' conquest by Beijing, as <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/03/14/speed-forward-fight-close-and-hit-hard-how-china-won-the-battle-of-the-paracel-islands/">Carl Shuster explains</a>:<blockquote>Saigon believed it had blocked Beijing’s latest attempt in a six-month intimidation campaign to take the western half of the Paracel chain.Armed Chinese fisherman had all but driven South Vietnamese fishermen from the area, and at least two Chinese fishing boats had been caught operating in waters claimed by South Vietnam.The latest Chinese activity, however, was the start of a new phase in an effort to seize all of the Paracels. This time the “fishermen” were members of the People’s Maritime Militia, a paramilitary arm of the Chinese navy.The two fishing boats off Robert Island reported to China’s South Sea Fleet headquarters.</blockquote>A similar (though less bloody) sequence set in motion the 2012 standoff that resulted in <a href="https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/">China's seizure of Scarborough Shoal</a>. This incident--which also started with an attempt to evict Chinese fishing ships--demonstrated how China's adversaries often fail to grasp its designs. Diplomats in Manila and Washington treated the Scarborough Shoal standoff as a crisis to be deescalated, while Beijing recognized a pretextual opportunity to use escalation to reset the board in its favor.&nbsp;This last example neatly sums up what China seeks to accomplish through its pretext-to-escalate tactic, and how other countries need to appreciate how China sees crises and escalation not as bugs but as features in achieving its maritime objectives.

large_f1707909362642.jpeg

medium_f1707909362642.jpeg

small_f1707909362642.jpeg

thumbnail_f1707909362642.jpeg

f1707909362642.jpeg

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Pretext to Escalate

It is long past time ...In order to (a.) bring aid and comfort to a remote population and (b.) demonstrate their commitment to West Philippine Sea security, Philippine and U.S. military forces should, at the earliest opportunity, jointly conduct a civic action mission to Thitu Island, <a href="https://news.abs-cbn.com/spotlight/multimedia/slideshow/11/03/21/on-pag-asa-hope-keeps-far-flung-island-community-afloat">which Filipinos call Pag-Asa</a>.&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/pagasa_island_jm_5_27b09b675c.webp?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1693535964&amp;Signature=SzL0nvZUi4D%2FrvSHMA31Rip4ClA%3D" alt="pagasa-island-jm-5.webp"><figcaption>One of 2 classrooms on Pag-Asa island. Jervis Manahan, ABS-CBN News</figcaption></figure><a href="https://samm.dsca.mil/glossary/military-civic-action">Civic action is defined as</a>:<blockquote>The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.&nbsp;</blockquote>The U.S. government--concerned about roiling the hotly contested South China Sea (SCS) waters by appearing to favor any one national claim over another--has long taken a very conservative approach to putting "boots on the ground" of any SCS feature (e.g., island, rock, reef, shoal, etc.).America sought to promote norms by which all claimants <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-south-china-sea-defining-the-status-quo/">maintained the tenuous status quo</a>--no new construction, militarization, new occupations or armed conflict. It thus seemed to make sense for the U.S. to maintain a certain detachment from the messy politics of who claims what across the Spratlys, and to treat any upsetting of the equilibrium with equal, stern disapproval.<figure class="image image_resized" style="width:32.39%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/South_China_Sea_claims_map_svg_79dcb403d0.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1693786809&amp;Signature=c1wxvQlXwfAO414Wgu1M04KkwFY%3D" alt="South_China_Sea_claims_map.svg.png"></figure>But that ship has long since sailed. Things are much different now.&nbsp;In particular, the Philippines faces an increasingly aggressive and hostile military and paramilitary threat from the People's Republic of China, which has upended that bygone status quo. In seeking to assert its sovereignty and jurisdiction over its extravagant and discredited <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/no-nine-dash-line-in-the-south-china-sea-2016-7">nine-dashed line claim</a> (see red line above), the PRC has systematically:<ul><li>seized control of both <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/c/abstract/?docid=451792">Mischief Reef</a> and <a href="https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/">Scarborough Shoal</a>, both of which lie squarely within the Philippines' internationally recognized <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone_of_the_Philippines">exclusive economic zone (EEZ)</a>;</li></ul><figure class="image image-style-side"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/mischief_reef_25c0fa01f4.webp?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1693535752&amp;Signature=c2y%2FiTy%2BTFMybkH5bNKuYbu6Pd4%3D" alt="mischief reef.webp"><figcaption>Mischief Reef -- by Ezra Acayan, Getty Images</figcaption></figure><ul><li><a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-manmade-island-fortresses-like-youve-never-seen-them-before">fully militarized Mischief Reef</a>, from which it now stages scores of navy, coast guard and maritime militia ships to regularly threaten Philippine ships, harass its fisherfolk and constrain its ability to conduct <a href="https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/analysis-reasserting-sea-control-over-reed-bank-averting-power-crisis/">much-needed hydrocarbon exploration</a>;</li><li>carried out a protracted and <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/the-time-bomb-of-the-philippines-brp-sierra-madre-is-ticking-down-to-zero">illegal blockade</a> of the Philippines' outpost at Second Thomas Shoal;&nbsp;</li><li>sent <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/04/12/persistent-chinese-maritime-militia-presence-off-philippines-raises-concerns-in-manila">swarms of vessels</a> to assert control of unoccupied features within the Philippines' EEZ and <a href="https://mb.com.ph/2023/03/05/44-chinese-vessels-swarm-pag-asa-island-pcg/">violate Thitu Island's territorial sea</a>.</li></ul>America's assiduously ambiguous posture toward SCS claims may have made a lot of sense in 1990, but an increasingly expansionist PRC regime has repeatedly and audaciously exploited this weakness in the U.S. stance to its own gain. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been far too slow to adapt its SCS policy to the new reality.Gray zone deterrence has failed in the SCS, and it's long past time for much more imaginative counter gray-zone policies to evolve.&nbsp;In fact, the Philippines has already led the way with its impressive maritime transparency policy rallying domestic resilience and international support, so this is the perfect opportunity to exploit the breach.A civic action mission will hardly seem like an audacious step, but ending its no-boots-on-the-ground policy can be a very important signal that America won't shy away from its <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-5/">repeated commitments</a> to honor its treaty obligations--including in the South China Sea.Of course, I have no doubt that even this modest step will meet with shrill accusations from Beijing that the U.S. is provoking China by challenging its "<a href="http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/SouthChinaSeaIssue160420001/201606/t20160620_8302834.htm#:~:text=The%201982%20UNCLOS%20provides%20in,part%20of%20the%20continental%20shelf.">indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands</a>". More delicately, it may also generate protests from Vietnam and Taiwan, both of which have their own extensively overlapping claims.&nbsp;The latter may be handled with quiet and proactive diplomacy, as both these governments--while probably obligated to formally object--will recognize that their own core interests are not really threatened by closer U.S.-Philippine integration. In fact, they will more likely (secretly) appreciate moves that complicate their chief rival's strategic SCS calculus.The expected PRC outrage, on the other hand, should be greeted with heart-warming pictures of the U.S. and Philippine military medical outreach and civil engineering projects ... as well as more solemn reminders of America's treaty commitment to Philippine security.<figure class="image image_resized" style="width:30.42%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/1000w_q95_54186ea7e2.webp?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1693539089&amp;Signature=90Ja%2FWji1WQpDz2huIYrkjPm3lA%3D" alt="1000w_q95.webp"><figcaption>U.S. Special Operations Pacific Medical Civic Action Program, Zamboanga, Philippines (2009), photo by Jerry Lobb</figcaption></figure>

large_Pag-asa-Island.webp

medium_Pag-asa-Island.webp

small_Pag-asa-Island.webp

thumbnail_Pag-asa-Island.webp

Pag-asa-Island.webp

It's time for U.S. troops to visit Thitu Island

On 21 June 2023, China's hydrographic research vessel Haiyang Dizhi Ba Hao (also known as Haiyang Dizhi 8, or HD8) began an extensive survey at Luconia Shoals on Malaysia's continental shelf--a project that has continued for over a month so far.&nbsp;<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_07_24_at_9_22_34_AM_6569519519.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1690766604&amp;Signature=MV6MpkpOdVXgJhwC8cXt8nX6sv4%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-07-24 at 9.22.34 AM.png">This survey is almost certainly unauthorized by Malaysia, and is therefore illegal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part13.htm">requires the surveyor to request consent six months in advance</a> of such activities.The HD8 is accompanied by three apparent maritime militia ships: Yue Mao Gang Yu 92777, Yue Zhan Yu 08046 and Yue Zhan Yu 08048. The AIS signals for these ships appear intermittently, indicating they are using the weaker Class-B transmitters, which are only detectable when a terrestrial or ship-borne receiver is in the area.When they are detectable, the militia ships are frequently seen together with four other AIS signals: HU 02, HU 03, HU 04 and 12366812061. My current theory on this is that each militia ship is carrying a hydrographic survey array--either of different types or just spares of the same type for HD8.&nbsp;In this view from 20 July each of the three militia ships has one of these other signals in such close proximity they are virtually superimposed over one another, while the fourth (HU 03) trails 3.5 nautical miles behind the HD8 moving east.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_07_24_at_10_00_40_AM_63e460c3f2.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1690768892&amp;Signature=4rRYntPMZ%2Fj07okBNAEoAiWZkt4%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-07-24 at 10.00.40 AM.png">The HD8's other constant companion is a China Coast Guard (CCG) ship, number 5202, which helps to screen it from the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) ships that come out to monitor the survey.&nbsp;Meanwhile, CCG 5402 is on its normal patrol, asserting China's claim of jurisdiction over Malaysia's gas fields to the east/southeast of the survey activity.In this view of AIS signals taken today (23 July), both CCG ships may be seen, with the KD Keris (RMN 111) keeping an eye on the survey while KD Bunga Mas Lima (RMN AUX 5) monitors CCG 5402. (For clarity I have excluded other signals, including those of the militia ships &amp; probable hydrographic equipment arrays.)<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_07_24_at_10_22_50_AM_7dfa9960ad.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1690770194&amp;Signature=FJruvNZA8G9RUEkt%2BzAkQEd%2FcXM%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-07-24 at 10.22.50 AM.png">That China did not seek such consent for this survey is conjecture on my part, but it seems a safe bet since China asserts jurisdiction over Luconia Shoals as part of its nine-dash line claim. This is the reason the CCG patrols this area almost continuously--at least <a href="https://amti.csis.org/flooding-the-zone-china-coast-guard-patrols-in-2022/">316 days in 2022</a> according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.&nbsp;Thus Beijing could hardly seek Malaysia's consent, as that would be an admission that its claim of jurisdiction is illegal.&nbsp;Because of the way China conflates its military and commercial activities, its ultimate purpose(s) for this survey can only be guessed at, but it certainly advances Beijing's consistent claims of "indisputable sovereignty" over the "adjacent waters" to the Spratly Islands within the nine-dash line.For its part, Malaysia's government <a href="https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/06/27/govt-to-continue-protecting-national-sovereignty-at-kasawari-beting-patinggi-ali-gas-fields">has said little publicly</a> about the activity since the early days of the survey.

medium_Haiyang Dizhi Ba Hao.jpeg

small_Haiyang Dizhi Ba Hao.jpeg

thumbnail_Haiyang Dizhi Ba Hao.jpeg

Haiyang Dizhi Ba Hao.jpeg

China has been surveying Malaysia's waters for over a month

Yesterday your humble correspondent was repeatedly accused of stoking tensions between the U.S. and the Philippines, <a href="https://www.manilatimes.net/2023/08/15/news/national/china-blames-ph-for-water-cannon-incident/1905388">first by China's Deputy Chief of Mission in Manila Zhou Zhiyong</a>:&nbsp;<blockquote>"Some 'trigger-happy' American forces stir up the situation in the South China Sea and relevant waters with the aim of arousing contradiction and even confrontation between China and the Philippines and disrupting peace and tranquility in the South China Sea."</blockquote>Mr. Zhou did not mention me by name, but my photo was literally over his right shoulder was he was speaking.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/RP_at_PRC_event_c389896fb3.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692694299&amp;Signature=%2B%2BXwpuA22pnh2BaS7AZl%2BNCUlb8%3D" alt="RP at PRC event.png">There's nothing wrong with "peace and tranquility", of course. The problem is that Beijing's version of it requires Manila to capitulate. By meekly accepting China's blockade of its outpost at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal--or better yet, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DWW0P7DVm5w">towing the BRP Sierra Madre off the shoal</a>--the Philippines can enjoy this peaceful, non-confrontational relationship (until Beijing makes its next demand, that is).In other words, surrender is the price of Mr. Zhou's "peace and tranquility". So yes, count me in favor of "disrupting" that.It was left to the man sitting to Mr. Zhou's right, the propagandist Herman Tiu Laurel, to name names in an <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-08-14/Are-there-hidden-U-S-motives-behind-recent-tensions-in-Ren-ai-Jiao--1meHP5SrGpy/index.html">interview</a> on China's state-run CGTN network:<blockquote>"In fact, I think there are not enough questions being asked by the ordinary Filipino who are emotionally reacting to this. Because if they did, they would find out that it's the Americans engineering this from the very beginning, because the report that was flushed in all the newspapers came from Raymond Powell, an ex-U.S. Air Force colonel from the Gordian Knot [Center]."</blockquote>Aside from essentially accusing the Filipino people of being emotional idiots and the Philippine government as being American puppets with no agency, Mr. Laurel's greatest accomplishment here is to utterly ignore the actual perpetrator of the blockade of the Sierra Madre and the water-cannoning of resupply ship.No, Beijing's approach is to attack the messenger as the problem. They do this because a gray zone actor wants the zone to remain as gray as possible, so that its malign actions can remain opaque and deniable. So yes, from China's perspective the messenger is absolutely the problem.Two final notes:1. I had been expecting this line of attack since I saw this event advertised late last week. Subtle, no?<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2023_08_11_at_2_33_34_PM_a13d6350f6.jpeg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692695112&amp;Signature=BEZ3f1%2BcKgN5tSCTxjZG97fGYtA%3D" alt="WhatsApp Image 2023-08-11 at 2.33.34 PM.jpeg">2. This is not the first time Mr. Laurel has held me up as the evil purveyor of disruptive lies.&nbsp;<figure class="media"><oembed url="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMNcdd2ERzw"></oembed></figure>

large_F3dTTebbMAAGjQ3.jpeg

medium_F3dTTebbMAAGjQ3.jpeg

small_F3dTTebbMAAGjQ3.jpeg

thumbnail_F3dTTebbMAAGjQ3.jpeg

F3dTTebbMAAGjQ3.jpeg

"Shut up", they reasoned

Ramming is the act of steering one vessel directly into another, damaging or even sinking it. China's paramilitary <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/pulling-back-curtain-chinas-maritime-militia">People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia</a> (PAFMM) operates scores of ships with reinforced steel hulls purpose-built for ramming.Some instances of ramming may be accidents caused by the failed application of other tactics, such as reckless <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-bow-crossing">bow-crossing</a>.&nbsp;The <a href="https://amti.csis.org/seeking-clues-in-the-case-of-the-yuemaobinyu-42212/">2019 ramming</a> of a wooden Filipino fishing boat, the F/B Gem-Ver, by the probable PAFMM ship Yue Mao Bin Yu 42212 caused a major diplomatic crisis between Beijing and Manila.Other examples:&nbsp;On the morning of <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/maritime-forces-destabilizing-asia/">April 2, 2020</a> near <a href="https://amti.csis.org/woody-island/">Woody Island</a> in the Parcels, Vietnamese fishing boat QNG 90617 TS was rammed and sunk by China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel Haijing 4301, after which the crews of QNG 90617 TS and two other Vietnamese fishing vessels were forcibly brought to the Chinese outpost on Woody Island for interrogation. The Vietnamese fishermen were only released after confessing to illegally fishing in Chinese waters.Vietnamese fishermen who came to rescue took these photos of the sinking QNG 90617-TS, courtesy of journalist <a href="https://twitter.com/ngahpham/status/1246279169975123969/">Nga Pham</a>:&nbsp;<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/E_Uus_Squ_Wk_AETNM_1_ba62447030.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691270232&amp;Signature=W7DrrFx9N%2F5j5ZZjbnrl8%2FAW8R0%3D" alt="Vietnamese fishing vessel QNg 90617-TS sinking after being rammed by CCG Haijing 4301. (Source: Nga Pham)">On <a href="https://thanhnien.vn/tau-ca-quang-ngai-lai-bi-trung-quoc-tan-cong-cuop-tai-san-o-hoang-sa-185508921.htm">September 29, 2015</a> near the Crescent Group in the Paracel Islands, a Chinese ship rammed a Vietnamese fishing vessel while its crew was asleep, according to Vietnamese authorities. The Chinese crew, armed with knives and electric batons, also beat up the Vietnamese crew and stole seafood and fishing gear worth tens of thousands of US dollars. Upon noticing that the Vietnamese boat was sinking, the Chinese vessel left, ignoring the fishermen's request for rescue.Between <a href="https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-oil-rig-standoff/">May 1 and July 15, 2014</a>, a major stand-off between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels took place after China deployed deep-water drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 into disputed waters off the Vietnamese coast. The operation was protected by a <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-swarming">flotilla</a> of Chinese vessels establishing a security cordon around the rig. Vietnam sent dozens of ships to disrupt the survey operation and subsequently documented a number of ramming incidents, including the following video published by the Vietnamese Coast Guard:<figure class="media"><oembed url="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7p41KKWleI"></oembed></figure><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/introducing-china-s-maritime-gray-zone-tactics-playbook">See the rest of the playbook here.</a>

Chinese tugboat Xinhai 285 rams Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance ship KN-951, June 23, 2014.

medium_china-vietnam-navy-coast-guard-south-china-sea-disputes-june-2014.jfif

small_china-vietnam-navy-coast-guard-south-china-sea-disputes-june-2014.jfif

thumbnail_china-vietnam-navy-coast-guard-south-china-sea-disputes-june-2014.jfif

china-vietnam-navy-coast-guard-south-china-sea-disputes-june-2014.jfif

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Ramming

large_SkyFi_5165 - Triton Island.png

medium_SkyFi_5165 - Triton Island.png

small_SkyFi_5165 - Triton Island.png

thumbnail_SkyFi_5165 - Triton Island.png

SkyFi_5165 - Triton Island.png

Nope--still no Chinese airfield at Triton Island

This morning I appeared in the CNN Philippines studio with the <a href="https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2023/1/28/pinky-webb-best-public-affairs-program-host-pmpc-stars-awards-for-tv.html">award-winning journalist Pinky Webb</a> to talk about this past weekend's incidents at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, in which--<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/china-s-aggression-against-philippines-resupply-mission-was-calculated">in a calculated action</a>--an armada of <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/08/07/video-china-coast-guard-blast-philippine-military-resupply-with-water-canons">six China Coast Guard, four PLA Navy</a> and 32 maritime militia opposed, harassed and impeded the Philippines' resupply of its outpost aboard the derelict ship, BRP Sierra Madre.First, Pinky is a total pro and clearly deserving of the honors she's received. Her questions were well informed, incisive and challenging.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_08_08_at_6_12_18_PM_d0d219f8f8.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692094391&amp;Signature=J0VuyIBVd6G9mAq080%2BqFog1FA4%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-08-08 at 6.12.18 PM.png">My bottom-line assessment can be summarized as follows:&nbsp;China's blockade is intended to result in the deterioration and ultimate abandonment of the Philippine outpost aboard the rusting BRP Sierra Madre--unless the Philippines, together with its U.S. ally and other security partners, comes up with its own strategy to break, circumvent or lift the blockade.Because the Sierra Madre is disintegrating, time and inertia are not on the Philippines' side, but will only result in China gaining control of the shoal and pushing the Philippines from one of its last outposts within its own exclusive economic zone.<figure class="media"><oembed url="https://youtu.be/umKMMJKAD3A"></oembed></figure>

large_Screenshot 2023-08-08 at 4.51.44 PM.png

medium_Screenshot 2023-08-08 at 4.51.44 PM.png

small_Screenshot 2023-08-08 at 4.51.44 PM.png

thumbnail_Screenshot 2023-08-08 at 4.51.44 PM.png

Screenshot 2023-08-08 at 4.51.44 PM.png

Today on CNN Philippines' "The Source": The Philippines needs a strategy to defeat China's blockade

I am frequently asked to comment on the interminable South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC) negotiations, and whether there are prospects for success. Sadly, I generally refer to myself as a <a href="https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/879789/code-of-conduct-on-scs-may-not-be-completed-maritime-security-expert/story/">CoC pessimist</a>.&nbsp;There's a simple reason for this: China is negotiating in bad faith.Too harsh? Look at the evidence and judge for yourself.China routinely and brazenly violates the existing Declaration on the Conduct (DoC) of Parties in the South China Sea--the agreement it signed with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations back in 2002.&nbsp;<a href="https://asean.org/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2/">Look at what</a> China's current Foreign Minister Wang Yi signed his name to on behalf of China:<blockquote>3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.</blockquote>Does China abide by the DoC? Let's look at the evidence just from the past eight months:<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_10_30_at_5_32_30_PM_bae0d1af65.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1699317288&amp;Signature=dXQCgtA9AuurzgKP%2BBeDmJAv0VM%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-10-30 at 5.32.30 PM.png">Beijing--which signed its commitment to the freedom of navigation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the exercise of self-restraint--has, by the application of overwhelming force, carried out a years-long illegal <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/speak-its-name-blockade">blockade</a> of a Philippine outpost in the South China Sea.&nbsp;Beijing has repeatedly and brazenly acted against the "universally recognized principles of international law"--including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)--based on its own unilaterally declared "<a href="http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/SouthChinaSeaIssue160420001/201606/t20160620_8302834.htm">indisputable sovereignty</a>" over the South China Sea.Does this sound like a country that negotiates in good faith?The entire reason ASEAN countries are so eager for an enforceable CoC is because China's violation of the DoC has been so egregious--and that is the very reason why China will never agree to the kind of CoC ASEAN needs.China's participation in CoC negotiations are a farce. In Beijing's view, all the responsibility for self-restraint and the peaceful resolution of disputes lies with its ASEAN neighbors, who are expected to restrain themselves and submit peacefully to Chinese dominion.&nbsp;Beijing's participation in CoC talks are merely the fig leaf behind which it hides its imperialist ambitions of conquest.Beijing's ultimate goal is to either:&nbsp;(a.) prolong the negotiations indefinitely until it consolidates its effective control over the entire South China Sea; or&nbsp;(b.) get a sufficiently weak and unenforceable CoC that it can then claim supersedes all other international laws by agreement of all "relevant" parties, thus resolving the dissonance between its supposed fidelity to UNCLOS and its serial violations of the same.

medium_1694837203-5000x3334.webp

small_1694837203-5000x3334.webp

thumbnail_1694837203-5000x3334.webp

1694837203-5000x3334.webp

China's Code of Conduct negotiations are a farce

small_Militia_Maritime_tanmen_china_16x9.webp

thumbnail_Militia_Maritime_tanmen_china_16x9.webp

Militia_Maritime_tanmen_china_16x9.webp

Why China's "Little Blue Men" are a Big Problem

Are you an imagery enthusiast? Have you dabbled in the world of open-source intelligence (OSINT)? Are you a South China Sea (SCS) watcher? Do you just love to solve puzzles?If so, you're just who we're looking for! Help SeaLight and our imagery partners at <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/">SkyFi</a> as we try to solve the mystery of what exactly China is building on Triton Island at the far west end of the Paracel group in the SCS.BackgroundLast month, The Drive created a minor sensation when it asserted that "<a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/runway-being-built-on-chinas-closest-island-outpost-to-vietnam">China is Building a Runway on its Closest Island Outpost to Vietnam</a>".&nbsp;<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_09_23_at_4_55_14_PM_3cc1b81ce0.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1696118183&amp;Signature=sR%2B1EAfKSmsB0PLSPI06dpFJfvo%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-09-23 at 4.55.14 PM.png">I was traveling in Singapore at the time, and was immediately taking calls from journalists interested in my opinions. Too eager to please, I took the calls and gave my half-baked hot takes, and then immediately regretted it. I started wondering if this was all happening too fast.&nbsp;I quickly did what I should have done first--I sent the article to two imagery analysts I trust.&nbsp;Of course there's nobody who's been looking at South China Sea commercial imagery as long and prolifically as <a href="https://www.csis.org/people/gregory-b-poling">Greg Poling</a> at the <a href="https://amti.csis.org/">Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative</a> (AMTI). Greg not only helped lead an OSINT revolution with AMTI, he literally <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Dangerous-Ground-Americas-Century-South/dp/0197633986">wrote the book on the SCS</a>. Unsurprisingly he was already digging into the question by the time I contacted him, and he and his team were <a href="https://amti.csis.org/a-new-chinese-runway-in-the-paracels-probably-not/">skeptical</a> of the runway theory.I also reached out to SeaLight's own analyst Bill Conroy, who eagerly dove into the question. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/alleged-runway-construction-triton-island-likely-tidal-william-conroy">Bill's analysis</a> followed a different path and came to the same conclusion at almost the same time.&nbsp;So ... probably not a runway. But what exactly is China working on at Triton Island?Enter SkyFiI couldn't help but being intrigued by the question, so I reached out to another colleague, SkyFi CEO <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/about/luke-fischer">Luke Fischer</a>. SkyFi is a company that seeks to make commercial imagery inexpensive and accessible for as many people as possible. In short, a company that also wants to "light up the gray zone"--a company after my own heart.&nbsp;Luke jumped in with both feet, and in short order Bill and I were brainstorming with Luke, his Operations VP <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/about/mike-pannos">Mike Panos</a>, Head of Strategy <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/about/kate-van-dam">Kate van Dam</a> and Growth Marketing Manager <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/about/tom-babb">Tom Babb</a>. We decided to try an experiment--let's crowdsource our Triton Island analysis and tap into all the smart people we know are out there.&nbsp;The SkyFi team quickly pulled fresh Triton Island imagery started a Discord discussion.&nbsp;<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_09_23_at_5_11_58_PM_406ebb4fc5.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1696119179&amp;Signature=fu4aO0VmxJZtMrWgHipd3dCQ3KQ%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-09-23 at 5.11.58 PM.png">Come join us!Now it's your turn! Help us solve the mystery. Apply your expertise, help us speculate, ask your own questions, challenge our assumptions ... or just follow along. What is China building at Triton Island? <a href="https://discord.com/invite/uuv7RCH29Q">Join our Discord discussion here</a>.

large_1692373647314.png

medium_1692373647314.png

small_1692373647314.png

thumbnail_1692373647314.png

1692373647314.png

What is China building at Triton Island? Help us crowdsource the analysis.

China's maritime militia has once again returned to stake out its semi-permanent presence at <a href="https://amti.csis.org/there-and-back-again-chinese-militia-at-iroquois-reef-and-union-banks/iroquois-reef-map-wm/">Iroquois Reef</a>, a feature that lies 125 nautical miles (nm) from the coast of Palawan and thus squarely within the Philippines' internationally recognized 200nm <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm">exclusive economic zone</a>.&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Iroquois_Reef_map_WM_784c0ea601.webp?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1715105656&amp;Signature=3pkXFTBi7WDI7x27YVx3veBV88U%3D" alt="Iroquois-Reef-map-WM.webp"><figcaption>Location of Iroquois Reef (Image credit: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative)</figcaption></figure>Recent satellite photos show the size and composition of China's current presence. This 22 April photo, obtained by SeaLight through its partnership with <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/">SkyFi</a>, shows two groups of "rafted" ships at the southern end of the reef.&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Sky_Fi_2418_KQOS_1_2024_04_22_0553_Z_DAY_HIGH_Unknown_36b3589e35.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1715104902&amp;Signature=5I8z8zs1H6IwWLMf7n2%2B3FEEvq4%3D" alt="SkyFi_2418KQOS-1_2024-04-22_0553Z_DAY_HIGH_Unknown.png"><figcaption>Rafted Chinese ships at Iroquois Reef. (Image credit: Satellogic, delivered by SkyFi)</figcaption></figure>SeaLight analyst Gaute Friis described how China uses this tactic to assert its maritime claims in a <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-rafting">post last July</a>--part of SeaLight's <a href="https://www.sealight.live/search?tag=Playbook">Gray Zone Tactics Playbook</a> series:&nbsp;<blockquote>"Rafting" refers to the gray zone tactic of tying ships together at anchor to establish semi-persistent floating outposts that are difficult to disperse due to their collective mass.&nbsp;The ships are generally the component of China's People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) known as Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV). According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative's detailed <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/pulling-back-curtain-chinas-maritime-militia">report on the PAFMM</a>, these SBFVs receive generous government subsidies to remain at sea for most of the year, specifically to assert Beijing's expansive maritime claims.As indicated by SeaLight Director Ray Powell in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_93bWSIzaQ">interview with Channel News Asia</a>, this gray zone tactic enables the PAFMM to effectively occupy features without the cost of new construction activity, while also being able to claim that the presence of its ships is both legal and unremarkable.</blockquote>Yet China's presence at Iroquois Reef is not limited to these SBFVs alone, but recently also included a visit by the China Coast Guard (CCG). The day before the above image was captured, SeaLight's partner Planet Labs caught CCG 4202 conducting an intrusive patrolling mission within the reef (large ship, center right of image below).&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/iroquois_reef_20240421_025217_24e0_rgb_flat_3m_2300px_logo_66_d2d8d71d07.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1715105392&amp;Signature=zkQT03ZF38ipnVcLQU83WuLgxZc%3D" alt="iroquois-reef_20240421_025217_24e0_rgb_flat_3m_2300px_logo[66].png"><figcaption>China Coast Guard 4202 at Iroquois Shoal, 21 April 2024 (Image credit: Planet Labs)</figcaption></figure>Analyst Gaute Friis also described this gray-zone tactic in a <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-intrusive-patrolling">separate post last November</a>:<blockquote>Intrusive patrolling describes how the China Coast Guard (CCG) routinely patrols within the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of other states. These patrols are a key component of China's strategy to reinforce its <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/chinas-vast-maritime-claims-are-becoming-reality/">expansive maritime claims</a> in disputed waters. By doing so, China aims to establish a continuous presence and gradually normalize its maritime activities in these areas.These patrols demonstrate Beijing's resolve to create de facto jurisdiction over areas clearly granted to other nations under the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm">1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)</a>.&nbsp;</blockquote>We know the specific identity of this ship because--although it has run mostly "<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">dark</a>" (yet another gray zone tactic) since leaving China--it briefly turned on its <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/what-is-ais-tracking-a-sea-light-primer">Automatic Information System</a> broadcasts while visiting Iroquois Reef on the very same day this shot was captured.<div class="raw-html-embed"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet">🚨As of 0640 local time, the 102-meter 🇨🇳<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/China?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#China</a> Coast Guard 4202 popped up at Iroquois Reef off the coast of Palawan in the 🇵🇭<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Philippines?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Philippines</a>' exclusive economic zone. Based on its intermittent detectability, it appears to be using the weaker Class B AIS safety broadcasts. [🧵1/3] <a href="https://t.co/VuBs0hp3at">pic.twitter.com/VuBs0hp3at</a>— Ray Powell (@GordianKnotRay) <a href="https://twitter.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1781832321836196267?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 20, 2024</a></blockquote> <script async="" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div>China's intrusion into Iroquois Reef is not new, as has been <a href="https://amti.csis.org/there-and-back-again-chinese-militia-at-iroquois-reef-and-union-banks/">documented by AMTI</a>, <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/china-s-illegal-fishing-fleet-at-iroquois-reef-in-the-west-philippine-sea-images-2">SeaLight</a> and the Philippine Coast Guard, which last year <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/coral-09182023173249.html">accused these vessels</a> of damaging the ecosystem there. In fact, precedent suggests its presence there may actually grow throughout the year.&nbsp;This is a story of theft by soft occupation--part of what the outgoing Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino has called China's <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-using-boiling-frog-tactic-with-military-us-admiral-2024-4">"boiling frog" strategy</a> to normalize its aggressions while increasing their scope and scale over time.One day soon we will wake up to find that yet another South China Sea frog has been fully cooked and served up for Beijing's consumption.

medium_Screenshot 2024-04-30 at 10.53.02 AM.png

small_Screenshot 2024-04-30 at 10.53.02 AM.png

thumbnail_Screenshot 2024-04-30 at 10.53.02 AM.png

Screenshot 2024-04-30 at 10.53.02 AM.png

Iroquois Reef: Theft by Soft Occupation

The 12,000-ton China Coast Guard (CCG) 5901, widely referred to as "The Monster", has mostly been running "<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">dark</a>"--not broadcasting its <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/what-is-ais-tracking-a-sea-light-primer">automatic information system (AIS)</a>--since departing Sanya port at Hainan Island on November 14th. (This frequent practice violates the <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx">International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea</a>, of which China is a signatory.)There have been three exceptions to the ship's dark operations over this period. It turned on its AIS last December 9th and 29th, and now most recently on January 7th.<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2024_01_07_at_2_41_40_PM_de655b7291.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1705272170&amp;Signature=v6ezzURTd%2FQLSOETKnYSNbC%2B2aI%3D" alt="Screenshot 2024-01-07 at 2.41.40 PM.png"><figcaption>Above: CCG 5901 illuminates on 9 December 2022</figcaption></figure><figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2024_01_07_at_2_39_33_PM_02199cc7cd.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1705272147&amp;Signature=J3AYKLeq471jV2PLptgRvGUkfAY%3D" alt="Screenshot 2024-01-07 at 2.39.33 PM.png"><figcaption>Above: CCG 5901 illuminates on 29 December 2022</figcaption></figure><figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2024_01_07_at_2_33_53_PM_39e4d92070.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1705271691&amp;Signature=sIpKxNjsl5cqHx5gqxtSB7Du%2BQM%3D" alt="Screenshot 2024-01-07 at 2.33.53 PM.png"><figcaption>Above: CCG 5901 illuminates on 7 January 2024</figcaption></figure>These patrols specifically target Vietnam's oil and gas operations in Blocks 06-01, 05-03, 12-11 and 12W according to a March 2023 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-sends-ship-track-chinese-vessel-patrolling-russian-gas-field-eez-data-2023-03-27/">analysis</a> by Reuters and the South China Sea Chronicle Initiative. Vietnam shadows these patrols with its much smaller fisheries surveillance fleet.SeaLight analyst Gaute Friis recently <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-intrusive-patrolling">described</a> the CCG's gray-zone tactic of intrusive patrolling, and how its "dark" vessels will often switch on their AIS transmitters to send a pointed message to its neighbors:<blockquote>China Coast Guard vessels regularly and visibly conduct intrusive patrols deep within the exclusive economic zones of neighboring countries, an activity meant to establish a continuous presence and gradually normalize Chinese jurisdiction over areas granted to its neighbors under international law.... CCG cutters conducting intrusive patrols often ensure their presence is noticed by engaging in "strategic illumination"—that is, switching their automatic information system (AIS) transponders on as they arrive in the area they will patrol, even if they were previously AIS-dark.</blockquote>CCG 5901's previous intrusive patrols through this area took place between 8 June and 5 July 2023, and by rotating with other CCG ships 5205, 5304 and 5403 helped ensure a near-constant PRC presence near Vanguard Bank.

large_F1DC6i5aYAAFh7M.jpeg

medium_F1DC6i5aYAAFh7M.jpeg

small_F1DC6i5aYAAFh7M.jpeg

thumbnail_F1DC6i5aYAAFh7M.jpeg

F1DC6i5aYAAFh7M.jpeg

China's "Monster" sends another message to Vietnam

Darkness tosses around in no direction and every direction all at once. Raw carnage sloshes on deck. A putrid stench covers everything. There’s no escape. This life is embedded in your eyes, mouth, hair and clothes.The 60-mile <a href="https://www.msc.org/what-we-are-doing/our-approach/fishing-methods-and-gear-types/longlines">long-line</a>--full of hooks--drags onto the ship. The deck lights reflect off all the glass-eyed tuna hooked on the line. You don’t know where you are because you haven’t seen land in two weeks, but you know the GPS tracker is turned off. Someone is closely watching the radar. The long-line is still coming in after two hours. A crude wedge detaches the hook from the catch— a shark loses an eye; a dolphin’s skull is ripped open as brains seep out; an aged sea turtle loses its lower jaw. They drop at your feet--simply, “<a href="https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-bycatch">bycatch</a>.” The shark’s fins are&nbsp;<a href="https://www.hsi.org/issues/shark-finning/">sawed off</a> and the crew casually tosses these dying animals overboard.You used to throw up. The fear, the smell, the relentless tossing in the darkness, the slaughter. But that was six years ago. At 13 years old, you answered an ad to work on a fishing boat. It was an escape from the impoverished village--a chance to make money and see the world. You haven’t been home since. You are barely permitted to step foot on land. You’ve seen your share of horrors — amputations, murders, rapes, and drugs. All for the fish. It may never end, but there is some solace in the money you are told goes to your family. You know the tuna will eventually make it to a rice bowl or plate in China,&nbsp;<a href="https://usa.oceana.org/reports/analysis-finds-americans-are-eating-seafood-from-countries-with-track-records-of-crimes-at-sea/">America</a>, Japan, or anywhere but here.&nbsp;— Welcome to the world of illegal fishing —The ocean is a vast, mostly lawless space. It has been a hub of criminal activity since humans began taking to the sea. It is no different today. The global fishing industry, necessary for food and economic security, has a dark side that thrives in the endless expanses of the world’s oceans. Thin profit margins and depleted fish stocks have pushed fleets away from their home waters into the business of illegal fishing, a conduit for further illicit activity — drug, human, and sex trafficking.&nbsp;No maritime entity is more successful in this gray zone of unmonitored ocean space. Fishing fleets rake in <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2023/06/07/6-facts-you-may-not-know-about-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing#">$36.4 billion per year</a> for their illegal catch and <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/number-small-fishing-vessels-smuggling-illegal-drugs-has-tripled-180976157/#:~:text=In%20a%20report%20by%20Global,billion%20to%20$652%20billion%20yearly">$80 billion per year</a> in illegal drug trade, while perpetuating human trafficking and forced-labor conditions.<a href="https://www.fao.org/iuu-fishing/background/what-is-iuu-fishing/en/">Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing</a> is an existential threat to the marine environment and fishing industry. This state-sanctioned maritime theft destroys ecosystems and ravages fisheries, crushing the economic prospects for generations of local fishermen. Local maritime agencies lack enough ships and aircraft to effectively monitor and protect their&nbsp;<a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm">exclusive economic zones</a>. Seven nations were identified by NOAA Fisheries in a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/noaa-identifies-certifies-nations-and-entities-to-improve-international-fisheries-management">2023 report</a> as engaging in IUU fishing.<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Japanese_fisheries_patrol_boat_and_Chinese_Illegal_fishing_boat_b10eaf15c7.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1703024125&amp;Signature=jZnBJOtyVbAJLYBxp3WyaP4CLho%3D" alt="Japanese_fisheries_patrol_boat_and_Chinese_Illegal_fishing_boat.jpg"><figcaption>Japanese fishing enforcement interdicts an illegal Chinese fishing boat in 2013. Image: USNI News</figcaption></figure>Fishing fleets, isolated in remote waters, are a hotbed for traffickers seeking to exploit vulnerable people and ecosystems. Other commercial vessels (container ships, tankers, etc.) are inspected at various ports of entry, tracked by the<a href="https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:-12.0/centery:25.0/zoom:4"> Automatic Identification System (AIS)</a>, and operate out of large, secure commercial ports. Fishing vessels, by contrast, are often not inspected by law enforcement authorities, operate from remote locations, and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">“go dark”</a> during at-sea smuggling events. These masters of the gray zone travel great distances under the pretense of legitimate fishing to offload humans and drugs (cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and chemicals to produce fentanyl) to smaller craft for transfer to land.Working conditions on these boats are essentially forced labor. People,&nbsp;<a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/04/human-trafficking-linked-to-illegal-fishing-in-gulf-of-guinea/">including children</a>, from impoverished areas are lured with the promise of substantial contracts only to be paid pennies on the dollar. More than 100,000 people&nbsp;<a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases-and-statements/2022/11/03/more-than-100000-people-die-annually-across-global-fishing-sector-new-research-shows">die each year</a> in this business of round-the-clock, hazardous work with no opportunity to escapeChina's 6,500-vessel Distant Water Fishing Fleet, a leading abuser of people and <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/maritime-heist">ecosystems</a>, was recently highlighted in the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/the-crimes-behind-the-seafood-you-eat">New Yorker</a> for its at-sea crimes and infestation of global fish markets. But China is not alone in its human rights abuses. Twenty-nine countries were identified in a<a href="https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2020-12/DOSNOAAReport_HumanTrafficking.pdf?null"> 2020 NOAA Fisheries report</a> as being at risk for human trafficking in their seafood sector.&nbsp;The U.S. is not absolved. In 2016, a ‘legal’ form of human trafficking of foreign crews on board Hawaii’s fishing fleet was <a href="https://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/hawaiian-seafood-caught-foreign-crews-confined-boats.html">brought to light.</a> Crew members, predominantly from Southeast Asia, had no visas, were unable to ever leave the fishing boats, and received well below U.S. minimum wage. This situation has&nbsp;<a href="https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/senate-bill-would-make-it-easier-for-foreign-workers-to-get-to-hawaiian-tuna-fishing-vessels">yet to be resolved</a>.The entanglement of illegal fishing with human, drug and sex trafficking stinks. It seeps into every country, restaurant, and fish market. Remember, the smell and taste of that fish on your plate begins on that teetering, humid, and acrid fish deck where there is no escape.&nbsp;

large_fish_traffic_4695f636ff.jpeg

medium_fish_traffic_4695f636ff.jpeg

small_fish_traffic_4695f636ff.jpeg

thumbnail_fish_traffic_4695f636ff.jpeg

fish_traffic_4695f636ff.jpeg

Death, Drugs, and Fish - The Shadow Industry Behind Your Seafood Special

When Philippine Coast Guard patrol ships <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRP_Malabrigo_(MRRV-4402)">BRP Malabrigo</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRP_Malapascua_(MRRV-4403)">BRP Malapascua</a> arrived at <a href="https://amti.csis.org/second-thomas-shoal/">Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal</a> for the monthly rotation and resupply mission to the Philippines' outpost aboard <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRP_Sierra_Madre">BRP Sierra Madre</a> on 30 June, they were greeted by an armada of Chinese ships, with two coast guard and seven militia ships surrounding the shoal.&nbsp;There was also an additional 90-meter vessel--not broadcasting an automatic information system (AIS) signal, but visible on satellite imagery--loitering near the Sierra Madre. Based on its size and location, this was likely either a People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) vessel or a third China Coast Guard ship.An additional seven militia ships lay just over the horizon in the vicinity of the nearby Chinese base at the artificially constructed <a href="https://amti.csis.org/mischief-reef/">Mischief Reef</a>.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_07_01_at_6_46_03_PM_3b1caa7163.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691026514&amp;Signature=7%2FHdqdlk5fxsrbTojAeWG7tLpRU%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 6.46.03 PM.png">One of the two China Coast Guard ships, CCG 3103, made an extraordinary 650-kilometer trip from <a href="https://amti.csis.org/scarborough-shoal/">Scarborough Shoal</a> to Ayungin Shoal, apparently for the sole purpose of contesting this resupply. It then returned directly back to Scarborough after the resupply was complete.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_07_01_at_6_41_23_PM_cd9759a926.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691026545&amp;Signature=YPvVQA4HvVcL0020BLgXzDF02p4%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 6.41.23 PM.png">Ordinarily, two lightly armed, 45-meter <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parola-class_patrol_vessel">Parola-class patrol vessels</a> would not be cause for this heavy-handed response by China. Beijing seems to sending a message to the Philippines that its recent challenges to China's sovereignty claims over this part of the West Philippine Sea have been noted with considerable displeasure.Notes: The <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/">2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling</a> found that "there exists no legal basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Second Thomas Shoal." It further found that "[the] ‘nine-dash line’ thus cannot provide a basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal that would overlap the entitlement of the Philippines to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf generated from baselines on the island of Palawan."Imagery credit: <a href="https://www.planet.com/">Planet Labs</a>

large_Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 6.10.03 PM.png

medium_Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 6.10.03 PM.png

small_Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 6.10.03 PM.png

thumbnail_Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 6.10.03 PM.png

Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 6.10.03 PM.png

China greets Philippine Coast Guard with armada at Second Thomas Shoal, 30 June 2023

Yes, there is a playbook!The Chinese party-state is using coast guard cutters and militarized fishing vessels (maritime militia) to enforce expansive and illegal territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS). These “gray zone” tactics enable Beijing to gradually force other actors out of waters claimed by China, while at the same time avoiding all-out armed conflict.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/42_FEB_450_3_D97_4786_BF_03_6_C4_D3_CAE_1_C45_cx0_cy15_cw91_w1023_r1_s_2e1ca0d69b.avif?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691369265&amp;Signature=PSc8rqpOCO1wNJuHTZtEcc3YCo8%3D" alt="42FEB450-3D97-4786-BF03-6C4D3CAE1C45_cx0_cy15_cw91_w1023_r1_s.avif">While Beijing's use of gray zone tactics is well known, it can be hard to find resources that describe these tactics in detail. These tactics are without clear precedent in nautical history, as China has invented a novel suite of maneuvers and methods to press its expansionary claims.That's why we have developed a new resource: China's Maritime Gray Zone Tactics Playbook—a publicly available, systematic examination of these tactics. We've examined hundreds of known incidents and identified a suite of 18 core tactics used by Beijing's gray zone actors. Over the coming weeks we will publish descriptions and examples of each of the tactics, including how and why China uses each of them to achieve its goal to dominate its maritime approaches.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/2021_03_31_T093356_Z_145415782_RC_29_MM_9_Y1_AAF_RTRMADP_3_PHILIPPINES_CHINA_SOUTHCHINASEA_8eb48e0582.webp?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691369286&amp;Signature=ETNXelXHZ%2FieGfEWg%2FHVaH0WSzo%3D" alt="2021-03-31T093356Z_145415782_RC29MM9Y1AAF_RTRMADP_3_PHILIPPINES-CHINA-SOUTHCHINASEA.webp">Our goal is to equip journalists, researchers, analysts and the general public to better comprehend and identify the nature of activities—which often defy conventional explanation—that are visible through satellite photography, automatic information system (AIS) vessel tracking data, and on-the-ground reporting.&nbsp;Descriptions are currently available for the following tactics:<ul style="list-style-type:square;"><li><a href="gray-zone-tactics-playbook-bow-crossing">Bow-Crossing</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-blocking">Blocking</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-swarming">Swarming</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-rafting">Rafting</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-cable-cutting">Cable-Cutting</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-ramming">Ramming</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-water-cannoning">Water Cannoning</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">Going Dark</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-spoofing">Spoofing</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-laser-dazzling">Laser Dazzling</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-over-the-horizon-hiding">Over-the-Horizon Hiding</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-intrusive-patrolling">Intrusive Patrolling</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-pretext-and-escalation">Pretext to Escalate</a></li></ul>&nbsp;

Chinese fishing vessels leave port in Fujian Province in August 2020

large_Leimbach-PRO-11-22 Hero.jpg

medium_Leimbach-PRO-11-22 Hero.jpg

small_Leimbach-PRO-11-22 Hero.jpg

thumbnail_Leimbach-PRO-11-22 Hero.jpg

Leimbach-PRO-11-22 Hero.jpg

Introducing China's Maritime Gray Zone Tactics Playbook

11 March updates: Thanks again to our partners at <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/">SkyFi</a> (and theirs at <a href="https://improsat.com.tr/">IMPRO</a>), we now have stunning new 50cm-resolution images of China's 21 rafted maritime militia vessels at Sabina Shoal, within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone and just 75 nautical miles from the Palawan coastline.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/GIZ_W_Jva_MAA_8hub_f0e1177aa2.jpeg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1710796433&amp;Signature=rH6WLGK8F4NsZ0lGTKSH0S%2F%2BX7Y%3D" alt="GIZ_WJvaMAA8hub.jpeg">Meanwhile, open-source intelligence sleuth MT Anderson noted a fourth group of five more rafted militia vessels a bit further northwest, making for a total of 26 known Chinese militia vessels at Sabina Shoal as of 6 March.&nbsp;<div class="raw-html-embed"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet">Don't forget there is a 4th floating 'blockade' at 9.797, 116.767 <a href="https://t.co/gul8927bdJ">pic.twitter.com/gul8927bdJ</a>— MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) <a href="https://twitter.com/MT_Anderson/status/1767240114839675125?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">March 11, 2024</a></blockquote> <script async="" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div>For more background and context about what these ships are and how Beijing uses this behavior to reinforce its extraordinary sovereignty or jurisdictional claims, please reference my original post below.<hr>Original post (4 March): SeaLight first spotted these vessels on imagery of Sabina Shoal last week and concluded they began arriving between 21 and 22 February, based on a comparison of low-resolution images obtained via <a href="https://www.planet.com/">Planet</a> and <a href="https://www.sentinel-hub.com/">Sentinel</a>. Then, working with our partners at <a href="https://www.skyfi.com/">SkyFi</a>, we were able to generate these first high-resolution images on 3 March.&nbsp;<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2024_03_05_at_3_58_24_PM_fda4b71d4b.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1710287940&amp;Signature=zplqPDOfXEQfEOeyCsCSbCJsyyQ%3D" alt="Screenshot 2024-03-05 at 3.58.24 PM.png">Subsequent low-resolution imagery indicates they are still in the same location as of 5 March.SeaLight previously documented 12-14 militia ships scattered around Sabina Shoal in <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/chinese-ships-return-to-sabina-shoal">November</a>, and the Philippine Coast Guard logged their presence there in the <a href="https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/875094/afp-chinese-vessels-swarm-iroquois-reef-sabina-shoal-in-wps/story/">summer of 2023</a>, but this is the first time we've seen them rafted together and in this southeast part of the shoal since <a href="https://x.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1628497997700169729?s=20">February</a> <a href="https://x.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1640035686370914305?s=20">through</a> <a href="https://x.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1643350925254479872?s=20">April</a> of last year:<div class="raw-html-embed"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet">In Sabina Shoal, which is much closer to Palawan mainland, there were 26 Chinese militia vessels (mostly tied together). The Wescom said in December that there’s a “swarming presence” of Chinese vessels in Iroquois Reef and Sabina Shoal since early 2022 <a href="https://t.co/lsBTvihJOP">https://t.co/lsBTvihJOP</a> <a href="https://t.co/B1QvJLRyx5">pic.twitter.com/B1QvJLRyx5</a>— Frances Mangosing 🇵🇭 (@FMangosingINQ) <a href="https://twitter.com/FMangosingINQ/status/1628341936678662145?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">February 22, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div>SeaLight analyst Gaute Friis described the "rafting" tactic these vessels are employing in a <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-rafting">blog post</a> last July, the first in our <a href="https://www.sealight.live/search?tag=Playbook">Gray Zone Tactics Playbook</a> series:&nbsp;<blockquote>"Rafting refers to the gray zone tactic of tying ships together at anchor to establish semi-persistent floating outposts that are difficult to disperse due to their collective mass ... this gray zone tactic enables the PAFMM to effectively occupy features without the cost of new construction activity, while also being able to claim that the presence of its ships is both legal and unremarkable.</blockquote>I further explained why China uses this gray-zone tactic during a July 2023 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_93bWSIzaQ">interview with CNA News</a>:<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_07_16_at_7_16_33_AM_86ae2475b4.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1710274032&amp;Signature=qnD8vA%2Fic4BLuRdjC1bXrXD0lqk%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-07-16 at 7.16.33 AM.png">Based on these vessels' behavior and on last year's observations, SeaLight concludes with high confidence that these ships are drawn from the PAFMM's Spratly Backbone Fleet (SBF).&nbsp;According to our friends at the <a href="https://amti.csis.org/">Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative</a>, the <a href="https://amti.csis.org/wherever-they-may-roam-chinas-militia-in-2023/">SBF is comprised of</a> "commercial vessels subsidized to operate in disputed waters to support Chinese sovereignty claims." <a href="https://amti.csis.org/the-ebb-and-flow-of-beijings-south-china-sea-militia/">These vessels</a>, as "the segment of the militia recruited from among the ranks of China’s commercial fishing vessels, take an extended winter vacation, as they are only required to spend 280 days of the year in disputed waters to earn their subsidies."&nbsp;This annual winter vacation would explain why they are just now arriving back at Sabina Shoal following the Lunar New Year holiday.For more background on what we're seeing at Sabina Shoal, "rafting", the maritime militia and what it all means, check out this video that I put together with SkyFi over the weekend:<div class="raw-html-embed"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/TvUILzj92OQ?si=v5Qoq374AjNL1N8v" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div>

large_GIZ_WJtbIAAOWDc.jpeg

medium_GIZ_WJtbIAAOWDc.jpeg

small_GIZ_WJtbIAAOWDc.jpeg

thumbnail_GIZ_WJtbIAAOWDc.jpeg

GIZ_WJtbIAAOWDc.jpeg

UPDATE: China's maritime militia has returned to Sabina Shoal

As of this writing, the Philippines has just produced evidence that its coast guard and resupply vessels were subjected to <a href="https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1812866/pcg-condemns-chinese-coast-guards-alleged-use-of-water-cannons-vs-its-vessels">assault by water cannons</a> from China Coast Guard ships on 5 August 2023. This occurred during the regular rotation and resupply mission to the Philippine Navy's outpost aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, and is reminiscent of a <a href="https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/11/18/Ayungin-Shoal-Chinese-Coast-Guard-Philippine-military.html">similar incident</a> in November 2021.A water cannon is generally considered an anti-personnel, non-lethal weapon, used to stop, discourage or punish an unwanted activity. The tactic consists of blasting another ship with a high-pressure water stream. It is a mainstay in South China Sea incidents, as it is one of very few ways ships at sea can kinetically attack other vessels in a way that is unlikely to cause severe damage to materiel or personnel.Even so, it is not hard to see how its use against a very small vessel like this one could turn catastrophic:&nbsp;<figure class="media"><oembed url="https://youtu.be/yRoSN4l24Wc"></oembed></figure> Other examples:&nbsp;On <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/15/vietnam-fishermen-attacked-chinese-boats-state-media.html ">June 7, 2015</a>, a Chinese vessel chased down and blasted a Vietnamese fishing vessel with its water cannon about four to five nautical miles from <a href="https://amti.csis.org/bombay-reef/">Bombay Reef</a>. One of the Vietnamese crewmen broke his leg during the altercation.The May-July 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 Oil rig <a href="https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-oil-rig-standoff/">standoff</a> saw numerous instances of water-cannoning. In one incident reported by Vietnamese state media, at 11:30 am on <a href="https://vir.com.vn/chinese-vessel-rams-breaks-vietnamese-ship-in-vietnams-waters-28034.html">June 1, 2014</a>, Vietnamese fisheries surveillance ship KN-635 was put under a sustained hosing barrage by a Chinese vessel. Two other Chinese ships (CCG 46001 and 46105) employing <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-blocking">blocking</a>, <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-ramming">ramming</a>, and water cannoning tactics prevented Vietnam Coast Guard cutter CSB 2016 from supporting the beleaguered KN-635.<img class="image_resized" style="width:79.92%;" src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/dau4_4_8e3a431d5e.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691852569&amp;Signature=2PznlPG0z7WW3ygYbB8sJ%2BUo3q0%3D" alt="CCG 46105 hosing Vietnam Coast Guard Cutter CSB 2016 with its water cannon (Source: VNA)"> &nbsp;&nbsp;<img class="image_resized" style="width:80.05%;" src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/dau4_5_574d537812.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691852651&amp;Signature=XcFPFJ3UAODmppyuNBcK4shtxqo%3D" alt="CCG 46105 ramming Vietnam Coast Guard Cutter CSB 2016, June 1, 2014 (Source: VNA)">CCG 46105 hosing and then ramming Vietnam Coast Guard cutter CSB 2016, June 1, 2014 (Source: &nbsp;VNA via <a href="https://thanhnien.vn/diem-mat-cac-tau-hung-han-cua-trung-quoc-185410.htm">Thanh Niên</a>)On <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26320383">27 January, 2014</a>, a CCG vessel employed its water cannon to force Filipino fishermen out of waters near <a href="https://amti.csis.org/scarborough-shoal/">Scarborough Shoal</a>. The Philippine government did not provide further details.<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/introducing-china-s-maritime-gray-zone-tactics-playbook">See the rest of the playbook here.</a>

CCG 31101 blasts a VCG vessel with water cannon, May 5, 2014. (Source: VCG)

small_2014-05-08T101641Z_60995041_GM1EA581CCA01_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-SEAS-VIETNAM.jpg

thumbnail_2014-05-08T101641Z_60995041_GM1EA581CCA01_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-SEAS-VIETNAM.jpg

2014-05-08T101641Z_60995041_GM1EA581CCA01_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-SEAS-VIETNAM.jpg

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Water Cannoning

Former senior U.S. diplomat Jim Carouso and I recently discussed historic <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-japan-philippines-meet-bolster-ties-security-worries-mount-2024-04-08/">April 11th Trilateral Summit</a> between President Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Kishida of Japan and President Biden of the United States.We had as our guests <a href="https://www.csis.org/people/christopher-b-johnstone">Chris Johnstone</a>, a long-time U.S. national security professional and the current Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC; and <a href="https://adrinstitute.org/team/">Victor "Dindo" Manhit</a>, Founder and Managing Director of the Stratbase Group in Manila. They highlighted the importance of this new trilateral initiative in demonstrating a united front against China's assertiveness in the region.&nbsp;Here's a sneak preview:<div class="raw-html-embed"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/UYSPu6vZlds?si=Qh29WnxdWotxTsM2" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div>Our discussion also highlighted the potential for increased military cooperation between the Philippines and Japan; the need for including economic incentives to strengthen the relationship; and remarked on the also-historic <a href="https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-united-states-japan-philippines-6f2c83d4157d9c8902d161ba2b23075a">quadrilateral U.S.-Japan-Philippines-Australia patrol</a> in the West Philippine Sea.Our conversation wraps up by taking on the question of whether these efforts are sufficient to deter China's aggression.You can watch the entire episode here:<div class="raw-html-embed"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9xj9myKD9BQ?si=au0Iq4raR5KpaJPe" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div>Alternatively, if you are a podcast enthusiast like me, I encourage you to download the episode on Apple Podcasts (or wherever you get your podcasts). While you're there, subscribe and give us a nice review so you can help us get the word out!<div class="raw-html-embed"><iframe allow="autoplay *; encrypted-media *; fullscreen *; clipboard-write" frameborder="0" height="450" style="width:100%;max-width:660px;overflow:hidden;border-radius:10px;" sandbox="allow-forms allow-popups allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-storage-access-by-user-activation allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation" src="https://embed.podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/why-should-we-care-about-the-indo-pacific/id1739675546?theme=light"></iframe></div>

large_Screenshot 2024-04-08 at 12.53.08 PM.png

medium_Screenshot 2024-04-08 at 12.53.08 PM.png

small_Screenshot 2024-04-08 at 12.53.08 PM.png

thumbnail_Screenshot 2024-04-08 at 12.53.08 PM.png

Screenshot 2024-04-08 at 12.53.08 PM.png

Why Should We Care About the U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Summit?

Dazzlers are an emerging category of non-lethal but potentially dangerous weapons and a relatively recent addition to China's gray zone arsenal. They can be used as a harassment tool; for destroying sensitive electro-optical sensors as an electronic warfare component; or as a weapon of psychological warfare.&nbsp;Dazzlers are not themselves considered illegal. The U.S. military—which refers to them as "non-lethal optical distractors"—considers them an essential capability to "<a href="https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Fact_Sheets/NL_Optical_Distracters_Fact_Sheet_May_2016.pdf">minimize fatalities, &nbsp;protect the innocent and limit collateral damage</a>" when the alternative is lethal force, with the caveat that:<blockquote>"Prior to fielding, all previously and currently fielded lasers or distracter devices have undergone legal reviews to ensure compliance with obligations assumed by the U.S. under applicable treaties, customary international law, and the law of armed conflict."</blockquote>China has used dazzlers to temporarily blind the crew of other countries' ships. Because dazzlers have both physical and <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA853-1.html">psychological</a> effects their use against vessels at sea is hazardous, eroding their crews' ability to navigate and react to maritime contingencies.As detailed in our "<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">going dark</a>" playbook entry, a Chinese Coast Guard cutter used a dazzler to harass a Philippine resupply escort mission on <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/13/asia/philippines-china-coast-guard-laser-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">February 6th, 2023</a>.<figure class="media"><oembed url="https://youtu.be/AchlNQAPMWs?si=2vcCGSF35dyDH81J"></oembed></figure>The Philippine Coast Guard later clarified that was the <a href="https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/14/23/pcg-china-laser-light-use-already-second-time">second time</a> this had occurred during a resupply mission.China has also employed dazzlers against U.S. and Australian aircraft since at least 2018, as documented in incidents over the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/27/politics/chinese-laser-us-aircraft/index.html">Pacific Ocean</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/feb/21/laser-incident-involving-china-extremely-serious-australian-experts-say">South China Sea</a>, the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/american-military-aircraft-targeted-by-lasers-in-pacific-ocean-u-s-officials-say-1529613999">East China Sea</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/feb/21/laser-incident-involving-china-extremely-serious-australian-experts-say">Arafura Sea</a>, and near the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/03/pentagon-china-lasers-djibouti-military-base">Horn of Africa</a>.&nbsp;Note: Any use of lasers to permanently blind personnel is illegal under <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.43_CCW%20P-IV.pdf">Protocol IV</a> (Blinding Laser Weapons) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which China joined in 1998.<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/introducing-china-s-maritime-gray-zone-tactics-playbook">See the rest of the gray zone playbook here.</a>

CCG 5205 firing laser at  Philippine Coast Guard cutter BRP Malapascua, February 6, 2023 (Source: Philippine Coast Guard)

medium__128612918_boat.jpg.jpg

small__128612918_boat.jpg.jpg

thumbnail__128612918_boat.jpg.jpg

_128612918_boat.jpg.jpg

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Laser Dazzling 

The <a href="https://gordianknot.stanford.edu/">Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation</a> at <a href="https://www.stanford.edu/">Stanford University</a> is pleased to announce the public launch of the <a href="https://www.sealight.live/">SeaLight</a> web site on July 12, 2023.&nbsp;SeaLight is a major milestone achieved after a year of hard work and innovation by the <a href="https://gordianknot.stanford.edu/project-myoushu">Project Myoushu</a> team--a collection of undergraduates, graduate students and volunteer professionals who collaborated to develop a method of rapidly informing the public about the harassment, coercion and other illegal activities that occur in the maritime "gray zone"--that collection of shadowy places at sea where malign actors thrive because they think they can't be seen.Using the Gordian Knot Center's entrepreneurial methodology the team concluded that public exposure is crucial to deterring gray zone actors and building resilience against them, but that governments are naturally slow to release information. That's why we decided to "light up the maritime gray zone" with commercially available data!<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_07_01_at_2_41_19_PM_0d44f434d8.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691026821&amp;Signature=huF%2BHzGhUrwribJYmacBwipFldE%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-07-01 at 2.41.19 PM.png">Since January 2023 we have been revealing gray zone activities across the Indo-Pacific, with special emphasis on the South China Sea. We have developed relationships with government officials, journalists, civil society leaders and other influencers to engage the public and inspire action against these predators and the governments that enable or accommodate them.Our new web site will be a portal for researchers who want to deep-dive the gray zone problem, as well as the general public just looking to understand what's happening and what's at stake.&nbsp;And of course, SeaLight will continue to expand the tools we have to expose the bad actors at sea.&nbsp;Join us as we continue to light up the maritime gray zone!

large_LogoColor.png

medium_LogoColor.png

small_LogoColor.png

thumbnail_LogoColor.png

LogoColor.png

SeaLight: Light Up the Maritime Gray Zone!

Tracking vessels' <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_identification_system">Automatic Information System (AIS)</a> signals is a core means SeaLight and other open-source intelligence collectors use to monitor maritime activity. AIS is a broadcast system that maritime authorities use to identify a vessel's unique identification number, type, position, course, speed and navigation status.&nbsp; The International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandates the use of AIS to ensure maritime safety and direct marine traffic more efficiently. According to the International Maritime Organization's <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx">International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)</a> Regulation V/19.2.4, all vessels over 300 gross tons (or 500 tons for those not on international voyages) and passenger ships of any size are required to "carry automatic identification systems capable of providing information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities."&nbsp;SOLAS came into effect in 1974—before the development of AIS—and 167 nations (including the People's Republic of China) have agreed to abide by its provisions. Its updated regulations now include the requirement for specified ships to have AIS "in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information".&nbsp;The limited exceptions SOLAS lays out cover two main categories:<ol><li>Military ships are exempt from the regulations, though many navies choose to broadcast AIS during routine operations as a safety precaution. Coast guard ships are not exempted.</li><li>A ship can suspend broadcast of its AIS signal for valid security reasons, such as when it is in imminent danger due to sailing in pirate-infested waters. In such circumstances, the AIS signal should be switched back on as soon as the threat is no longer imminent, and a report detailing the actions and reasons should be saved in the ship's log and submitted to the relevant authority.</li></ol>Class A AIS vs Class B AIS There are two types of AIS transponders: <a href="https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/types-of-ais">Class A and Class B</a>. The distinction is that Class B transponders are low-powered devices with limited functionality, and are intended for voluntary use by vessels not covered under SOLAS AIS regulations, such as small fishing boats and pleasure craft.&nbsp;Only Class A signals are detectable by satellite receivers, with Class B signals having a limited range of about 8-10 nautical miles. Therefore, Class B-equipped ships are generally only visible when they navigate very close to a land-based receiver or another passing ship.&nbsp;Many larger ships include information about AIS signals they receive in their own satellite uplinks. This means that some ships' Class B data only becomes visible to the ship-tracking community when a properly equipped larger ship passes by its location.The following scenarios illustrate how ships may or may not be visible on AIS depending on circumstance: &nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Sea_Boats_Boat_1_fb8bb2e02f.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692933075&amp;Signature=vHgFH8QeL%2F2mrtIY19mUP2%2FY0Tw%3D" alt="SeaBoats_Boat 1.png"><figcaption>Scenario 1: The Class B vessel is in range of a land-based antenna while the Class A ship is in range of a satellite. In this scenario, both A and B are visible on AIS.</figcaption></figure>&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Sea_Boats_Boat_2_5bc134f883.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692933075&amp;Signature=V3Gry2rF5HyXB6ur6vu408nmkg0%3D" alt="SeaBoats_Boat 2.png"><figcaption>Scenario 2: Both the Class A and Class B vessels are in range of a satellite, but only the Class A ship will be visible on AIS as Class B signals are not collected by satellites and the Class B vessel is too far from a land-based antenna.&nbsp;</figcaption></figure>&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Sea_Boats_Boat_3_be37d1fe9b.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692933075&amp;Signature=dAxfytDbrLn%2Fu2bMAj%2B4OSBUhcs%3D" alt="SeaBoats_Boat 3.png"><figcaption>Scenario 3: Both the Class A and Class B vessels are in range of a satellite, but only the Class A ship is connected to the satellite. However, the Class B vessel will still be visible on AIS because its signals are received by the Class A vessel via a ship-to-ship connection and transmitted to the satellite.&nbsp;</figcaption></figure>AIS Abuse and Countermeasures AIS was designed in the early 1990s and lacks basic cybersecurity features such as independent verification and encryption. It is therefore easy for the gray-zone operator to manipulate the system to obscure its activities. The most common methods these actors use include:<ol><li>Switching from Class A to Class B or turning off AIS transmissions completely. We call this tactic "<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">going dark</a>".</li><li>Deliberately broadcasting false information (such as a ship's flag state, type or location), which we call "spoofing".&nbsp;</li></ol>A second-generation evolution of AIS called VHF Data Exchange System (VDES) is currently in the early stages of implementation. VDES will be more robust to malicious manipulation, but it is still years away from widespread adoption.&nbsp;In the meantime, AIS abuse can be counteracted by methods such as <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">close analysis</a> of AIS signals; <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ship-tracking-winward-ai">AI-enabled</a> behavioral analysis; and tracking vessels using other sensor types, such as <a href="https://qz.com/satellites-are-hunting-dark-vessels-that-evade-sancti-1849751673">satellite imagery</a> or <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/article/satellite-rf-tracking-follows-the-dark-ships-that-ais-can-t-see">radio frequency (RF)</a> detection.&nbsp;The continued evolution of these sensors will make it harder for bad actors to hide in the maritime gray zone.

large_SeaBoats_Boat 1.png

medium_SeaBoats_Boat 1.png

small_SeaBoats_Boat 1.png

thumbnail_SeaBoats_Boat 1.png

SeaBoats_Boat 1.png

What is AIS tracking? A SeaLight primer

This century has seen two great innovations in counter gray zone statecraft--at least in the maritime space--and the Philippines authored both of them.A decade ago, Manila initiated an incredible lawfare coup by taking China to court in The Hague, ultimately walking away with a arbitration victory so sweeping that Beijing could do little in response except try to <a href="http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2023-07/13/content_92131216.htm">dismiss it as "illegal, null and void"</a>.&nbsp;Yet while the election of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/18/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-president-china-make-friends-not-war">more friendly Philippine government</a> may have eased the ruling's bite somewhat, China has not been able to escape its long-term consequences. The <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/">2016 decision</a> has stood the tests of both time and neglect, becoming more integral to the international argument against China's maritime aggressions, even as it continues to gain <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/07/05/india-revises-stance-on-china-philippines-maritime-dispute-as-new-delhi-looks-east">significant new support</a>.By any reasonable measure, the Philippines changed the game by conclusively reframing its maritime contest with China from one of "us vs. them" to one of "right vs. wrong."Fast-forward to 2023, and we find ourselves gazing in wonder at a second great Philippine innovation. This time Manila's target is the gray zone of opacity and deniability in which China has so relentlessly pressed its advantage, and its chief weapon is photography, applied purposefully, generously and consistently over time.It's an approach we at SeaLight have termed "assertive transparency", and it is a game-changer.Assertive transparency describes the tactic of deliberately seeking out the dark spaces where gray zone actors conduct their illegal, malign and coercive acts, and then exposing them to public view.&nbsp;<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/water_cannon_be15ede107.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1697324921&amp;Signature=xKZqg30iwrZw7auaMSz2anFxfMY%3D" alt="water cannon.jpg">To state the obvious, a gray zone actor thrives where the zone is gray. The full light of day is its natural adversary.&nbsp;Put another way, China has enjoyed an asymmetric advantage by its willingness to exploit <a href="https://www.theoutlawocean.com/">the outlaw ocean</a>'s natural murkiness. This is the year that Manila found and leveraged its own asymmetric advantage by exposing what China wanted to remain hidden.&nbsp;<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/357510369_655045006657797_6982474430550818718_n_f626a847ea.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1697324950&amp;Signature=rH75sm%2BDBo6C1fSSkO%2Botc4p2kE%3D" alt="Chinese fishing vessels in the Philippine EEZ, June 30 2023">This brings us back to the diagram at the top of the page, because transparency is ultimately a means to an end, not the end itself. Lighting up the maritime gray zone is one crucial tactic in pursuit of a larger objective--deterring and defeating gray zone activities.<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_10_07_at_9_22_23_AM_938824b678.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1697320806&amp;Signature=5dGxMYXLVRTnDzCBqTABFzFL%2Fhw%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-10-07 at 9.22.23 AM.png"><figcaption>How assertive transparency sets conditions for deterring and defeating gray zone activities.</figcaption></figure>In 2023, the Philippines has effectively used assertive transparency to help it set conditions for success by:1. &nbsp;Strengthening national resilience, whereby a nation rallies its people and institutions to engage effectively in the long-term gray zone contest. Success requires investments in maritime security when domestic needs are pressing; bold action when acquiescence seems far easier; and political courage when rivals shout criticism. In a democracy, none of this is sustainable without the support of the population, which will not long support campaigns against adversaries it can't see.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/33_NR_69_X_1248px_15ebe9961d.webp?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1697325222&amp;Signature=eYVRXaUNyOWlGjs5iPjMIhmhmbw%3D" alt="33NR69X-1248px.webp">2. Building international support, which provides invaluable leverage to a smaller country vying against a larger one. The Philippines' transparency campaign has yielded impressive moral support from like-minded governments across the globe. There has also been evidence of increased material aid, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/australia-says-it-will-conduct-more-joint-patrols-with-philippines-south-china-2023-08-25/">promises</a> of <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/09/17/japan/japan-philippine-australia-patrols/">joint</a> West Philippine Sea <a href="https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2023/04/13/2258498/philippines-us-finalize-plans-joint-patrols-south-china-sea">patrols</a> and help in <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3359459/fact-sheet-us-philippines-22-ministerial-dialogue/">building the country's maritime capacity</a>.3. Imposing reputational costs on the gray zone actor, forcing it to recalculate the increased risks of continuing its aggressions against the benefits it hopes to achieve from them.Though assertive transparency is not itself sufficient to win a protracted struggle against a powerful, ruthless and determined gray zone actor, it is an exciting and important innovation--one which has given Manila a new means to check China's seemingly inexorable quest to consolidate its control of the West Philippine Sea.It has also given the rest of the world something to think about. Now will others follow suit?

large_Screenshot 2023-10-07 at 9.22.23 AM.png

medium_Screenshot 2023-10-07 at 9.22.23 AM.png

small_Screenshot 2023-10-07 at 9.22.23 AM.png

thumbnail_Screenshot 2023-10-07 at 9.22.23 AM.png

Screenshot 2023-10-07 at 9.22.23 AM.png

Assertive Transparency: The Philippines' Counter Gray Zone Innovation

large_Screenshot 2024-08-18 at 10.07.09 PM.png

medium_Screenshot 2024-08-18 at 10.07.09 PM.png

small_Screenshot 2024-08-18 at 10.07.09 PM.png

thumbnail_Screenshot 2024-08-18 at 10.07.09 PM.png

Screenshot 2024-08-18 at 10.07.09 PM.png

China's Disinformation is Testing the Philippines' Transparency Initiative 

This tactic is an act of sabotage which aim to cut the cables to a ship's trailing equipment, such as trawler lines or towed array sonars.&nbsp;Cable-cutting is most frequently used against commercial research vessels conducting survey operations in disputed maritime zones, such as within China's huge "nine-dash line" claim in the South China Sea.&nbsp;The tactic has also been used to obstruct U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering operations. In <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3175192/effective-control/ ">March 2009</a> the unarmed US Navy ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable faced coordinated harassment by Chinese ships and aircraft during hydrographic survey operations near Hainan Island. Chinese sailors demanded the Impeccable's departure as two fishing trawlers made unsuccessful attempts to target the ship's sonar array by running it over and attempting to snag it with long hooked poles.&nbsp;<figure class="media"><oembed url="https://www.youtube.com/embed/hQvQjwAE4w4"></oembed></figure>The Impeccable responded by using a high-pressure water hose against one trawler. Later, the trawlers joined forces with navy, fisheries law enforcement and marine surveillance vessels to temporarily block the Impeccable's exit.&nbsp;Editors note: China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) and China Marine Surveillance (CMS) were maritime law enforcement units that have since been disbanded and merged into a unified China Coast Guard (CCG) in a <a href="https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/creation-china-coast-guard.pdf">2013 reorganization</a>.&nbsp;Other examples:On <a href="https://apnews.com/article/2e3102f4501d43a18aee54149e722442 ">November 30, 2012</a>, two Chinese fishing vessels (likely maritime militia) cut the seismic survey cables of Vietnamese research ship Binh Minh 02, belonging to the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group, PetroVietnam. This followed a previous <a href="https://vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/2011/05/chinese-marine-surveillance-ships-violate-vns-sovereignty">May 26, 2011</a> incident in which three Chinese maritime surveillance ships also cut the Binh Minh 02's seismic equipment.Also during <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf ">May 2011</a>, during a survey of an oil and gas block 150 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast, the Norwegian-flagged Viking 2, contracted by PetroVietnam and Japan's Idemitsu, encountered an unidentified Chinese ship that intentionally collided with its towed instruments. Two security boats accompanying the Viking 2 intervened and drove off the Chinese ship. Two days later, the survey vessel again faced harassment, this time from two Chinese fishing vessels (later revealed to be maritime militia). The boats attempted to damage the cables but were thwarted by the escort ships.<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/introducing-china-s-maritime-gray-zone-tactics-playbook">See the rest of the playbook here.</a>

Chinese fisherman using a boat hook pole in an attempt to snag the cable connecting U.S ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable’s towed sonar array, March 8, 2009. (Source: USN)

large_USNS_Impeccable_090308-N-0000X-004.jpg

medium_USNS_Impeccable_090308-N-0000X-004.jpg

small_USNS_Impeccable_090308-N-0000X-004.jpg

thumbnail_USNS_Impeccable_090308-N-0000X-004.jpg

USNS_Impeccable_090308-N-0000X-004.jpg

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Cable-Cutting

"Going dark" refers to the gray zone tactic of turning off a vessel's <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_identification_system">Automatic Information System (AIS)</a> transponder to avoid detection. AIS is a signaling system used to identify a vessel's type, position, course, speed and other navigation safety information, and is required by the International Maritime Organization for larger non-military ships operating in international waters. Read our primer on the AIS system <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/what-is-ais-tracking-a-sea-light-primer">here</a>. &nbsp; Going Dark in the Recent Water Cannon IncidentIn a <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/08/07/video-china-coast-guard-blast-philippine-military-resupply-with-water-canons">recent incident</a> that involved the blockade and water-cannoning of a small Philippine resupply vessel and its escorts, six of the blockading ships were from the China Coast Guard.&nbsp;Of these, only one ship (CCG 5402) remained AIS-visible during the entire engagement, while two other ships (CCG 4203 and CCG 3302) broadcast AIS only intermittently.&nbsp;We can observe these periods of AIS-darkness from the dotted lines in the schematic below.&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/AIS_Data_CCG_Water_Cannon_acdc9e1eee.jpeg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692426246&amp;Signature=gTYy29o%2Bphr9jYrnfMObY7nIpUs%3D" alt="AIS Data CCG Water Cannon.jpeg"><figcaption>Figure 1. CCG AIS data around Second Thomas Shoal on August 5, 2023.</figcaption></figure> The three other China Coast Guard ships documented by the Philippine Coast Guard as having taken part in the blockade--CCG 5201, 5304 and 5305--remained AIS-dark throughout the entire encounter.&nbsp;<div class="raw-html-embed"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet">The Philippine Coast Guard expresses strong condemnation towards the unlawful behavior exhibited by the China Coast Guard vessels (CCG 4203 and CCG 5305) for their unwarranted use of water cannons against the MRRV-4409. Additionally, we call on the CCG to adhere to the COLREGS… <a href="https://t.co/iSI2DU6JWP">pic.twitter.com/iSI2DU6JWP</a>— Jay Tarriela (@jaytaryela) <a href="https://twitter.com/jaytaryela/status/1688475722950864896?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">August 7, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div>CCG 5304 arrived at China's military base at nearby Mischief Reef on 15 July with its AIS illuminated, and then patrolled the area for just over two weeks before moving east of Second Thomas Shoal. It then went dark near Sabina Shoal four days before the resupply mission.The graphic below illustrates how 5304 went dark on 1 August, while the dashed line represents the fact that it was not detected again until it reappeared to the northwest 8 days later, after the resupply when it was well on its way back to Hainan Island. The period when it was in contact with the 5 August resupply mission is entirely missing from its AIS broadcast record.<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_08_17_at_8_37_35_AM_7936622155.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692837589&amp;Signature=p6k9dGouhpfbZGK1vYt7JEfS1ME%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-08-17 at 8.37.35 AM.png"><figcaption>Figure 2. CCG 5304 goes dark on 1 August</figcaption></figure>Meanwhile, CCG 5305 went dark on 30 July while still inbound to the Spratly Archipelago, nearly a week before the resupply mission. As of this writing nearly three weeks later the ship is still AIS-dark.<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_08_17_at_8_46_30_AM_b801601985.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692838940&amp;Signature=wa6ZpLdBaLGguPCjxLzJswE2LSY%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-08-17 at 8.46.30 AM.png"><figcaption>Figure 3. CCG 5305 goes dark 30 July</figcaption></figure>The last CCG ship involved in the 5 August blockade, number 5201, is a notoriously shadowy vessel which seldom turns on its AIS transmitter. Even when it does, it generally uses a bogus identification number (412000008) which it shares with dozens of other Chinese ships.Though extreme weather conditions can hinder the transmission of AIS data, no such conditions were present on 5 August. These ships clearly either turned off their AIS transponders or switched from their stronger Class A transponders to weaker Class B signals to avoid detection and mask their activities.&nbsp; Dark operations and bright lasersCCG ships frequently go dark when disrupting these Second Thomas Shoal resupply missions. On 6 February 2023, for example, CCG 5205 harassed the Phillippine Coast Guard ship BRP Malapascua while impeding its resupply escort mission using a bright green laser, or "dazzler".As the Malapascua approached its rendezvous with the resupply boats near Sabina Shoal on the evening of 5 February, CCG 5205 headed into its path before going dark. It remained dark during the resupply on 6 February, when it was documented as the <a href="https://globalnation.inquirer.net/210843/china-harasses-philippine-coast-guard-vessel">perpetrator in the laser incident</a>.<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_08_17_at_9_15_51_AM_b9b4edabb3.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692839795&amp;Signature=gvqY%2BnZg2bDVuXrT6CizECRnhjA%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-08-17 at 9.15.51 AM.png"><figcaption>Figure 4. CCG 5205 goes dark on 5 February</figcaption></figure><figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Feb_6_Laser_34307c3d0a.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692430023&amp;Signature=xod8WsM9j5WXXCAGa%2BNSkDj2kbI%3D" alt="Feb 6 Laser.jpg"><figcaption>Figure 5. CCG 5205 uses "military-grade laser" against BRP Malapascua on 6 February 2023</figcaption></figure>Strategic illuminationFinally, some vessels play the dark operations tactic in reverse when they specifically want to be noticed. This is common in the oil and gas fields off Vietnam's southeastern coast. In these cases, we often see CCG ships turn on their transmitters while they patrol near Vanguard Bank, indicating that China is openly asserting its jurisdiction over these waters.This example from July 2023 is typical. Below we see the world's largest coast guard ship, the 12,000-ton CCG 5901, illuminate its AIS on 3 July just before crossing into Vietnam's EEZ from the south. It then goes dark again on 6 July after completing its patrol, before moving off to the east.<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_08_17_at_9_38_01_AM_d6c2c3d128.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692841592&amp;Signature=WruIRhaqjYmQtVcKJg7Kfs6jdsc%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-08-17 at 9.38.01 AM.png"><figcaption>Figure 6: CCG 5901 illuminates AIS specifically for its Vanguard Bank patrol.</figcaption></figure><a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/introducing-china-s-maritime-gray-zone-tactics-playbook">See the rest of the playbook here.</a>

medium_AIS Switching Off (Credits-Unseenlabs).png

small_AIS Switching Off (Credits-Unseenlabs).png

thumbnail_AIS Switching Off (Credits-Unseenlabs).png

AIS Switching Off (Credits-Unseenlabs).png

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Going Dark

Spoofing is a deception tactic meant to disrupt monitoring of maritime activities. It is frequently employed by Chinese gray zone actors in the South China Sea. In contrast to the “<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">going dark</a>” tactic of simply disabling a vessel’s <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/what-is-ais-tracking-a-sea-light-primer">Automatic Information System (AIS)</a> broadcast, the spoofing tactic involves manipulating transmitting signals in order to falsify a vessel's identity and/or location.Spoofing has come to be used as an umbrella term that encompasses a range of AIS-tampering techniques. We divide these techniques into three primary buckets:<ol style="list-style-type:decimal;"><li>Identity spoofing, or continuously broadcasting false vessel information.</li><li>Identity switching, or temporarily changing vessel information when conducting certain activities.&nbsp;</li><li>Location spoofing, or embedding false GPS location data within a vessel’s AIS transmissions.&nbsp;</li></ol>Valid AIS identities for spoofing purposes can be acquired by various methods, such as simply assuming the identity of another operating vessel ("identity theft") or the identity of a scrapped ("zombie") vessel. A gray zone actor may also switch to a fraudulently obtained IMO-registered shell identity ("identity laundering"). <a href="https://windward.ai/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Hiding-in-Plain-Sight-PDF.pdf">This white paper</a> by maritime intelligence provider Windward goes into more detail about these practices.&nbsp;1. Identity spoofing &nbsp;&nbsp;Ship operators are responsible for manually entering their AIS broadcast messages into their own transponders. This makes it easy to manipulate basic information such as a vessel's name, type, length, tonnage, or Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI)—a 9-digit reference number administered by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) that should be unique to each ship.&nbsp;One unsophisticated method is for vessels to enter the country code followed by all zeros (XXX000000). In fact, so many ships do this that it can lead to multiple vessels operating simultaneously with the same fake ID.&nbsp;For example, on April 18 2023, a China Coast Guard cutter intercepted a Philippine resupply mission to <a href="https://amti.csis.org/second-thomas-shoal/">Second Thomas Shoal</a> while broadcasting an AIS signal identifying itself only as "G", a 2x2m pleasure craft with MMSI 412000000--a <a href="https://globalfishingwatch.org/data/spoofing-one-identity-shared-by-multiple-vessels/#:~:text=We've%20seen%20many%20Chinese,We%20call%20this%20spoofing.">bogus number used concurrently</a> by dozens of other ships around the globe.<div class="raw-html-embed"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet">BREAKING: Prob. <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Philippines?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Philippines</a> resupply to Ayungin (2nd Thomas) Shoal w/ <a href="https://twitter.com/coastguardph?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@coastguardph</a>'s BRP Malapascua escorting. Prob. <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/China?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#China</a> Coast Guard identifying as "G" (2x2m "pleasure craft" w/bogus MMSI) intercepting near Sabina Shoal as 2 maritime militia take position east of Ayungin. <a href="https://t.co/wDOSsl7pqv">pic.twitter.com/wDOSsl7pqv</a>— Ray Powell (@GordianKnotRay) <a href="https://twitter.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1648399654101581825?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 18, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div>2. Identity switching&nbsp;It is so easy to manually change AIS broadcast data that occasionally ships are caught red-handed switching identities during sensitive operations. One example of this occurred on <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/03/30/chinese-war-ships-cutters-still-sailing-near-philippine-holdings-in-south-china-sea">March 21 2023</a>, when China Coast Guard cutter 5201 abruptly changed its callsign from "CCG5201" to "DONGYU1527-8 50%" while shadowing the Philippine Coast Guard vessel BRP Malapascua on a routine patrol mission in the Spratly Islands."Yu" (鱼) is Mandarin for "fish" and is often used in Chinese fishing boat names, which strongly suggests what the offending ship hoped its watchers would believe in this clumsy spoofing effort.<div class="raw-html-embed"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet">Before returning to Buliluyan Port on March 21, MRRV 4403 patrolled Ayungin Shoal, CCGV 5201 shadowed <a href="https://twitter.com/coastguardph?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@coastguardph</a> ship at a distance of approximately 1,600 yards. The PCG observed that CCGV 5201 suddenly changed its AIS info from CCG5201 to DONGYU1527-8 50%. <a href="https://t.co/tUOgKh0Z5h">pic.twitter.com/tUOgKh0Z5h</a>— Jay Tarriela (@jaytaryela) <a href="https://twitter.com/jaytaryela/status/1641189829953355776?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">March 29, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div>3. Location spoofing&nbsp;It is also possible for a more sophisticated gray zone actor to insert fake GPS location data into an AIS boadcast, which makes the spoofing vessel appear to to be in a different location. We are unaware of any known incidents of Chinese security vessels spoofing their locations in the South China Sea, but location spoofing is a <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/11/15/131940/ghost-ships-crop-circles-and-soft-gold-a-gps-mystery-in-shanghai/">well known tactic</a> in <a href="https://skytruth.org/2019/12/systematic-gps-manipulation-occuring-at-chinese-oil-terminals-and-government-installations/">other</a> maritime contexts.&nbsp;Suffice it to say, AIS spoofing in all its forms endangers shipping and other lawful maritime activity, hinders transparency and effective monitoring, and contravenes both <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/what-is-ais-tracking-a-sea-light-primer">norms and rules</a> for safety at sea and ITU regulations.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/introducing-china-s-maritime-gray-zone-tactics-playbook">See the rest of the gray zone playbook here.</a>

A China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter transmits fraudulent AIS signals to nearby vessels, appearing as a fishing boat on their monitoring equipment (Credit: Gaille Powell).

large_SpoofingB.png

medium_SpoofingB.png

small_SpoofingB.png

thumbnail_SpoofingB.png

SpoofingB.png

Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Spoofing

From 19-21 September, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessels BRP Cabra and BRP Sindangan patrolled Sabina (Escoda) Shoal and Iroquois (Rozul) Reef, where they were shadowed by China Coast Guard (CCG) ship 4301. The Philippines has recently accused China’s fishing and maritime militia fleets of causing severe damage to these two underwater features within its exclusive economic zone, and is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/22/philippines-mulls-court-action-against-beijing-in-south-china-sea-dispute">contemplating taking a case</a> to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague over the matter.<figure class="image image_resized" style="width:80%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_09_22_at_2_18_01_PM_0916564cf9.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1696030032&amp;Signature=d7bPehnFXBU2UxJAzU3et5HEjKw%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-09-22 at 2.18.01 PM.png"></figure>&nbsp;The two PCG ships arrived at Sabina Shoal early on 19 September, appearing to examine its northeast approaches before entering the shoal’s interior from the southeast and remaining there overnight. CCG 4301 left its patrol near Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal and arrived at midday on 19 September to observe them from the west.<figure class="image image_resized" style="width:82.36%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_09_22_at_2_19_56_PM_b2f2002f50.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1696030056&amp;Signature=HyhYQ74jiZfHFuDVNp3Te2Z2X9U%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-09-22 at 2.19.56 PM.png"></figure>&nbsp;Later that evening, CCG 4301 briefly went back to China's naval base at the nearby Mischief Reef artificial island before returning to Sabina Shoal.Meanwhile, apparently concerned that the PCG ships would attempt to approach its <a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/the-time-bomb-of-the-philippines-brp-sierra-madre-is-ticking-down-to-zero">outpost aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre</a> at Second Thomas Shoal, 10 additional maritime militia ships deployed from Mischief Reef on 20 September. They took up blocking positions east of the shoal, joining two other militia ships which were already there.<figure class="image image_resized" style="width:82.22%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_09_22_at_3_39_49_PM_8fa24421da.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1696030076&amp;Signature=bSiYJBdBf4cqWO2EFlxiJ0qr%2Bn0%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-09-22 at 3.39.49 PM.png"></figure>&nbsp;But instead, on 20 September the two PCG ships moved north from Sabina Shoal to inspect Iroquois Reef. CCG 4301, meanwhile ranged 120 km to the east for reasons that are not clear, finally turning back to the northwest toward Iroquois Reef at 0400 on 21 September.<figure class="image image_resized" style="width:82.92%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_09_22_at_2_21_37_PM_3b7a9dedaa.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1696030106&amp;Signature=4vdr7I%2FnKjiBzjfxqn4PlL9DoAo%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-09-22 at 2.21.37 PM.png"></figure>&nbsp;CCG 4201 arrived at Iroquois Reef 1600 on 21 September, just as the two PCG ships started for home. The Chinese ship followed the PCG vessels for 120 kilometers, not turning back until they were about 30 kilometers southwest of Sabina Shoal.&nbsp;<figure class="image image_resized" style="width:45.42%;"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_09_22_at_2_25_12_PM_bca7aaaec8.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1696030140&amp;Signature=JmgEZXIdgO9CknQRNG2of2SyJUA%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-09-22 at 2.25.12 PM.png"></figure>&nbsp;The CCG ship was mostly “dark” (not broadcasting its automatic information system, or AIS signal) during that period. As SeaLight analyst Miao Shou recently explained in "<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/gray-zone-tactics-playbook-going-dark">Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Going Dark</a>", CCG ships frequently resort to dark operations when they are involved in operations they don't want detected:<blockquote>"Going dark" refers to the gray zone tactic of turning off a vessel's Automatic Information System (AIS) transponder to avoid detection. AIS is a signaling system used to identify a vessel's type, position, course, speed and other navigation safety information, and is required by the International Maritime Organization for larger non-military ships operating in international waters.</blockquote>&nbsp;

small_Chinese-fishing-vessels-iroquios-reef.webp

thumbnail_Chinese-fishing-vessels-iroquios-reef.webp

Chinese-fishing-vessels-iroquios-reef.webp

Philippine Coast Guard patrols the reefs it just accused China of damaging

This past week in Manila has been a whirlwind, following the dramatic water-cannoning of the Philippines' resupply ship near Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal. The outrage here has been palpable, with everyone--from senior government officials, politicians and civic leaders down to the taxi drivers and waiters with whom I've spoken--expressing anger at China's bullying behavior toward its smaller neighbor.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/water_cannon_be15ede107.jpg?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692417700&amp;Signature=o8t9zCf6s0J6s%2FGIuv%2FBkODDEFk%3D" alt="water cannon.jpg">The outrage is justifiable. The context, however, is far more ominous.This isn't just one of a series of unconnected incidents. This is a focused campaign by Beijing to illegally blockade the Philippines' outpost aboard the BRP Sierra Madre until it succumbs to the elements--which, unless something changes, it inevitably will.&nbsp;At that point China's campaign will have succeeded in winning control of this key location just 100 nautical miles from the coast of Palawan and deep in the heart of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.<img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/main_qimg_625461f853d7da8bab9067eed294fc50_8f8ad286ee.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1692418532&amp;Signature=m%2FbIQM2%2BOjktZZOW4wR1vQ%2FQv%2FU%3D" alt="main-qimg-625461f853d7da8bab9067eed294fc50.png">Many are hesitant to use the word "blockade", citing legalities and fearing the implications, since blockades have long been considered acts of war under international protocols.&nbsp;Yet what is clearly happening is the systematic and forceful denial of access by Philippine vessels to a Philippine naval outpost in Philippine waters, in direct defiance of the internationally recognized <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/">2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling</a> which found unequivocally that, "there is ... no possible entitlement by China to any maritime zone in the area of either Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal ..."That's an illegal blockade, and we need to say so out loud.&nbsp;Why?First, it's hard to solve a problem you won't enunciate. What the Philippines faces is not simply serial harassment of its coast guard and resupply boats. The reason China has repeatedly targeted these specific vessels is that the successful delivery of construction materials to the Sierra Madre delays the outcome China has long sought--the Philippines' abandonment of its outpost.&nbsp;That's an illegal blockade, and what is needed is a strategy to lift, break or circumvent it.Second, China has not paid the international cost this despicable behavior clearly merits. Beijing has been able to carry out this gray-zone campaign of aggression against its neighbor, and has suffered little more than the relatively mild approbation of disconnected parts of the international community. While most of us have been justifiably focused (thanks to the Philippines' recent transparency policy) on the individual <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/13/asia/philippines-china-coast-guard-laser-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">laser-pointings</a>, <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-04-27/chinese-ship-blocks-philippine-vessel-as-journalists-watch">blocking actions</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/video/chinese-vessel-sprays-water-cannon-on-philippine-boat-in-disputed-sea/BFC84216-B393-4D70-93B6-307AF414AD07.html">water cannons</a>, we've failed to absorb the bigger picture that's right in front of our collective faces.&nbsp;Finally and crucially, China's blockade strategy is working. Unless the Philippines--together with its U.S. ally and like-minded security partners--is able to somehow defeat this blockade, the end of the Sierra Madre will come.&nbsp;In fact, judging by its current condition the end may be far nearer than anyone is ready for.&nbsp;What happens when the numbers on this time bomb tick down to 0:00, and suddenly this grounded, deteriorating ship begins to break apart or slide off the shoal? Who shows up to "rescue" the Filipino troops and "manage" the situation? It would almost certainly be the country with the preponderance of forces in the area--the one with constant coast guard and maritime militia patrols of the area and a fully equipped naval base just 20 nautical miles away at Mischief Reef.On that day China will have defeated the Philippines in a long-fought and important gray-zone battle--one in which last weekend's water-cannon incident was but a small skirmish in a much larger and more consequential, illegal campaign.Beijing calculates that it will do just that, and that the price it will pay for illegally blockading and ultimately seizing Second Thomas Shoal will be little more than more mild approbation.Is Beijing wrong? It hasn't been so far.

small_jcr_content.jpg

thumbnail_jcr_content.jpg

jcr_content.jpg

The time bomb of the Philippines' BRP Sierra Madre is ticking down to zero

The China Coast Guard's 5 August water-cannon assault on the Philippines' resupply mission didn't just happen. Things didn't just get out of hand.&nbsp;No, China has clearly been planning for this calculated aggression.Three months prior to yesterday's resupply, China's force in the area around Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal consisted of a single coast guard vessel and three maritime militia ships. A month ago it had expanded its militia force to 17 ships. By yesterday's mission China had 4 coast guard and 32 militia ships ready to interdict the resupply.&nbsp;[Update: The Philippine Coast Guard has since <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/08/07/video-china-coast-guard-blast-philippine-military-resupply-with-water-canons">reported</a> that they encountered a total of 6 China Coast Guard and 4 PLA Navy ships.]While most of the militia ships remained in the rear area near Mischief Reef, most weighed anchor and deployed from the port in the hours leading up to the resupply.&nbsp;<figure class="image"><img src="https://sealight-backend-node-storage.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Screenshot_2023_08_06_at_1_36_31_PM_51068f1667.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVE4QLT4P5J7YX57L&amp;Expires=1691905047&amp;Signature=BKpiMCNKJ1nFRK1tAm4BZotrqE4%3D" alt="Screenshot 2023-08-06 at 1.36.31 PM.png"><figcaption>Two Philippine Coast Guard ships supported by one Navy offshore patrol vessel escorting resupply boats encounter an armada of 4 China Coast Guard and 32 militia ships.</figcaption></figure>The signal was clear--China was ready and willing to escalate even further if need be.Beijing has obviously made the calculation that the Philippines' new assertiveness in defending its exclusive economic zone, strengthening its U.S. alliance and other security partnerships, and publicizing China's gray-zone aggression in the West Philippine Sea represents an affront that must not be tolerated. An example must be made.&nbsp;In the infamous words of former foreign minister <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yang_Jiechi">Yang Jiechi</a>: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."&nbsp;"Small countries" are expected to know their place.Manila has stubbornly refused to accept its assigned place. Instead it immediately released the evidence of this escalation for all to see. This has already earned it <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-5/">renewed support from the U.S.</a>--which again reaffirmed its intent to honor its Mutual Defense Treaty obligations--as well as a host of other like-minded partners.&nbsp;In fact, the past 6 months of Chinese aggression and Philippine transparency have only served to further internationalize this issue and further isolate China.Meanwhile, China's weak attempts to change the subject--either by inviting the Philippines' former president to Beijing or proposing joint naval exercises--simply cannot compete with visuals like this:<figure class="media"><oembed url="https://youtu.be/n1eT8CiDvsM"></oembed></figure>China water-cannons Philippine resupply vessel near Ayungin Shoal, 5 August 2023. Video courtesy Jay Batongbacal via Twitter/X.

large_F20QF0kbsAE6tKb.jpeg

medium_F20QF0kbsAE6tKb.jpeg

small_F20QF0kbsAE6tKb.jpeg

thumbnail_F20QF0kbsAE6tKb.jpeg

F20QF0kbsAE6tKb.jpeg

China's aggression against Philippines' resupply mission was calculated

Swarming is a commonly used tactic involving dispatching a flotilla (often a combination of militia, coast guard, and sometimes navy vessels) to overwhelm and intimidate other countries' assets, assert dominance, or provide a security screen for certain Chinese ships on special missions.&nbsp;Examples:&nbsp;Starting on <a href="https://twitter.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1661808137329049601">May 7, 2023</a>, Chinese survey ship Xiang Yang Hong 10 and a flotilla of escort vessels consisting of China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessels spent <a href="https://twitter.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1665447690329808896">nearly a month</a> conducting survey operations deep within Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). These activities led to a <a href="https://asianews.network/vietnam-demands-china-withdraw-survey-ship-vessels-from-vietnamese-waters/">formal protest</a> from the Vietnamese government.&nbsp;On <a href="https://mb.com.ph/2023/03/05/44-chinese-vessels-swarm-pag-asa-island-pcg/">March 4, 2023</a>, one People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship, one CCG ship and 42 PAFMM vessels gathered near <a href="https://amti.csis.org/thitu-island/">Thitu Island</a>. Thitu Island (also known as Pag-Asa) is home to one of the Philippines' most important military outposts in the West Philippine Sea, as well as a small civilian population.&nbsp;<div class="raw-html-embed"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet">1/ANATOMY OF A SWARM: How <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/China?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#China</a> sent its ships to swarm &amp; intimidate the <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Phlippines?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Phlippines</a>’ largest outpost in the West Philippine Sea, then scattered after its tactics were made public, 3-11 March 2023. By 5 March the swarm of Pag-Asa Island was well underway. (1/9)<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/SouthChinaSea?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#SouthChinaSea</a> <a href="https://t.co/sdt3ykXfpD">pic.twitter.com/sdt3ykXfpD</a>— Ray Powell (@GordianKnotRay) <a href="https://twitter.com/GordianKnotRay/status/1634504034651623424?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">March 11, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div>On <a href="https://vtc.vn/tau-ca-ngu-dan-ly-son-lai-bi-tau-trung-quoc-dam-hong-ar165405.htm">July 22, 2014</a>, a Vietnamese fishing boat was surrounded by Chinese vessels 5 nautical miles South of <a href="https://amti.csis.org/collins-reef/">Collins Reef</a>. Chinese coast guard ships then rammed the fishing boat, which nearly sank.On<a href="https://baophapluat.vn/trong-nuoc/tau-trung-quoc-to-chuc-thanh-nhieu-vong-ngan-can-tau-viet-nam-188745.html"> June 29</a><a href="">, </a><a href="https://thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/tau-tq-ngan-can-quay-pha-tau-ca-cua-ngu-dan-vn-226279.html ">2014</a>, 45 nautical miles to the southwest of Paracel Islands, about 34 Chinese fishing vessels, supported by 2 coast guard ships, closely followed, obstructed and intimidated Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the area.<a href="https://www.sealight.live/posts/introducing-china-s-maritime-gray-zone-tactics-playbook">See the rest of the playbook here.</a>

Chinese fishing vessels head out to sea from Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province, China.

Infographic: Chinese Provocations in the South China Sea

Ray Powell

Share

Share:

Ray Powell

More Articles