What is happening?

The day after the shocking August 11th collision between two Chinese vessels during a confrontation at Scarborough Shoal, China initiated a maritime buildup 350 nautical miles to the south at Second Thomas Shoal. This escalation continued until August 20-21, which saw the deployment of at least five coast guard cutters, nine maritime militia ships and around 15 smaller boats--a mix of fast interceptors and rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs) supported by aerial assets. 

The assembled Chinese forces conducted water cannon drills and some of the small boats (armed with mounted heavy weapons) approached within 50 meters of the BRP Sierra Madre, the Philippines' grounded outpost manned by about a dozen Marines. This prompted Philippine troops to deploy their own boats to keep the Chinese forces from directly threatening their vulnerable outpost. 

This surge marked the largest Chinese presence at the shoal for over a year and has reignited tensions, with accusations of provocation from both sides. Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr. ordered his troops to prevent any Chinese boarding of the Sierra Madre "at all costs," amid concerns that the next rotation-and-resupply mission could trigger further escalation in the disputed West Philippine Sea.

How has it come to this?

It was just over a year ago that we watched a harrowing scene unfold at the Philippines' beleaguered outpost aboard a derelict ship grounded atop a reef in the South China Sea at Second Thomas Shoal, which the Philippines calls Ayungin Shoal and refers to as China Ren'ai Jiao.

That event was a culmination of 18 months of increasing tensions around the shoal, or more specifically the Philippines' periodic resupply efforts for its outpost. We'd observed how the China Coast Guard and maritime militia opened up its entire gray zone tactics playbook--repeatedly blocking, swarming, ramming and water-cannoning Philippine vessels in a systematic effort to impede and deny access by unarmed resupply boats and their coast guard escorts.

This led the Philippines to abruptly change tactics on 17 June 2024, when it attempted a low-profile approach using Navy seals in small RHIBs rather than coast guard cutters operating in the open to escort the supplies. The attempt at stealth failed, however, and the China Coast Guard reacted strongly to the subterfuge. The footage shocked the world.

The dramatics apparently got Beijing's attention as well, as a deal was subsequently struck to lower the temperature around the resupply missions--an intentionally opaque agreement which allowed room for each side to claim the other had agreed to its terms. Since that time, resupply missions have been quiet and uneventful affairs, while the South China Sea drama moved on to other features: Sabina Shoal, Sandy Cay and Scarborough Shoal. 

In all three of the above cases, China has consolidated its effective control by overwhelming presence and occasional direct action: at Sabina Shoal it used the pretext of an anchored Philippine Coast Guard ship to lay effective siege and force it to retreat; at Sandy Cay it has steadily made it inaccessible to visits from Philippine ships and personnel; and at Scarborough Shoal it has built and widened an exclusion zone over the past 16 months. This last set the stage for the 11 August collision between a Peoples Liberation Army-Navy destroyer and a China Coast Guard cutter, after they discovered a much smaller Philippine Coast Guard vessel had slipped through the screen.

Why now?

It was likely a desire to change the subject from this caught-on-camera embarrassment that served as the proximate cause for this latest shift by Beijing back to Second Thomas Shoal. That the current buildup of forces around the shoal began on August 12th, one day after the collision far to the north, would seem to support that hypothesis.

Yet the proximate cause is not the only cause for the sudden escalation there, and this is why leaders in Manila, Washington DC and beyond need to be paying close attention. The events of the past two years make it clear that an increasingly confident and aggressive Beijing has decided that its window of opportunity has opened to assert full control over its vast claims over the South China Sea--or at least that part of it that lies within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. 

China has chosen the Philippines from among the other Southeast Asian claimants as its target for a variety of reasons. Geography is one--there are just a lot of rocks, reefs and shoals offering themselves as convenient targets in Philippine waters. A second is a desire to punish Manila for having the temerity to openly resist its encroachments while warning its neighbors not to follow suit--to "kill the chicken to scare the monkey". The most important, however, is to undermine and fracture the U.S. Indo-Pacific alliance system by exposing what it hopes will prove America's inability or unwillingness to effectively back up its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with Manila.

Why Second Thomas Shoal?

There's nothing that has stuck in Beijing's craw quite like the continued presence of that rusty World War II-era Philippine ship sitting atop Second Thomas Shoal. Ever since Manila intentionally grounded it there in 1999 in a desperate attempt to counter China's placement of "fishing huts" atop the nearby Mischief Reef, Beijing has loudly demanded its removal. In China's calculus, Mischief Reef (now a major military base) was fairly siezed but the BRP Sierra Madre is a wholly illegitimate outpost, and its continued presence stands as a visible challenge to its dominion. 

Its problem is the aforementioned treaty. Any direct assault on the outpost would clearly force Manila to invoke the "armed attack" clause from Article IV. Even the scene of starving the dozen or so Philippine marines aboard the vessel via a full blockade would certainly be met with strong international condemnation and perhaps also tempt the limits of the treaty. Unlike the ship at Sabina Shoal last year, this one can't simply weigh anchor and sail home if it can't be resupplied--its occupants would ultimately need to be rescued, surrender or perish if such a siege were extended.

What are the risks?

That brings us back to the current crisis, because ultimately what China wants is for the Philippines to hand them an opportunity--a pretext to move on the ship without triggering direct intervention by the U.S., which it likely calculates is preoccupied with other theaters from Europe to the Middle East to South America. Indeed, if not for the incredible restraint demonstrated by Philippine forces over recent months we might have already reached this point. All Beijing needs is for the Philippines to fire the first shot.

That's why it's so important for China's state media to frame each incident as a Philippine provocation. It doesn't need the whole world to believe its increasingly sophisticated but still obvious propaganda. It just needs to inject enough deniability to foster doubt and equivocation in capitals where leaders might quietly sympathize with Manila, but whose greater wish is for the whole thing to just go away. Beijing doesn't need the world's approval, just its equivocation.

China has been waiting for its opportunity to move on Second Thomas Shoal. How far will push this time? Even as I type it has moved an additional four maritime militia into the area from the west, so the answer for now seems to be at least a little farther. 

Where can I learn more?

Listen to my podcast co-host Jim Carouso and I talk about this latest incident on the Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific? podcast: